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Hobby Lobby: The Crafty Case That
Threatens Women's Rights and Religious
Freedom
by LESLIE C. GRIFFIN*
Introduction
In the name of religious freedom, the Supremie Court authorized
the Green family, the Christian owners of the Hobby Lobby
corporation, to impose their religious faith upon their female
employees through force of law.' The Greens openly oppose abortion
for religious reasons and believe that four of the twenty
contraceptives, for which the Affordable Care Act ("ACA") 2 requires
insurance coverage, cause abortion. They asked the Court for an
exemption from the ACA. The Court held that employers did not
have to prove that the contraceptives were actually abortifacient
drugs. Rather, the Court ruled, the Greens only had to assert their
belief sincerely in order to become exempt from the law's
requirements to protect women's health and equality. The Court's
decision thus "impose[d] the employer's religious faith on the
employees"' in the name of religious liberty without regard for
medical evidence or women's rights.
Despite the pro-religion rhetoric surrounding it, Hobby Lobby
marks a loss of religious freedom. Missing from the majority's
opinion is the core concept that religious freedom is necessary to
* William S. Boyd Professor of Law, UNLV Boyd School of Law,
leslie.griffin@unlv.edu; B.A., University of Notre Dame; Ph.D., Religious Studies, Yale
University; J.D., Stanford Law School. My thanks are due to Professors Marci Hamilton,
Mark Tushnet, Thomas Main, Anita Bernstein, and Blake Johnson for help with this
Article, and to the late John Rawls for setting me on the pathway toward constitutional
reasoning.
1. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
2. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, § 1001(a)(5), 42 U.S.C.A. § 300gg-
13(a).
3. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982).
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protect the rights of all Americans, and that a religious belief must
not be imposed on citizens through the force of law. Any
interpretation of the First Amendment or the Religious Freedom
Restoration Act ("RFRA")' that imposes one citizen's religious faith
upon another must be rejected.
This Article defends this non-imposition model of religious
freedom and describes why and how Hobby Lobby incorrectly
departed from it. Part I explains that Hobby Lobby is part of a
twenty-year trend that imposes religious values through the force of
law. Part I.A describes the broad acceptance of the imposition model
within the most popular theories of constitutional interpretation. Part
I.B. traces the similarly far-reaching application of the imposition
model by politicians, legislators and judges that culminated in Hobby
Lobby. Part II demonstrates the value of the non-imposition model
by tracing its success in the same-sex marriage equality movement. A
review of state and federal same-sex marriage cases establishes that
same-sex plaintiffs won whenever courts ruled that religious opinion
could not be imposed through law (Part II.A) and lost wherever
religious values won (Part II.B). Part III argues that civil rights are
always endangered by the law's imposition of religious values. Hobby
Lobby demonstrates that religion-based law undermines women's
right to equality. The next step will be the loss of gay and lesbian
rights, as believers claiming exemption from laws protecting gays and
lesbians threaten the advances of marriage equality. I conclude that
religious freedom is best protected when the Constitution and laws
are interpreted to advance a shared political and legal system based
on common values rather than religious ones.
I. The Trend Toward Hobby Lobby
My non-imposition model of government is straightforward. It
holds that legal and political problems must be decided by legal and
political principles. When resolving questions of public policy,
everyone---citizens, judges, presidents, legislators-must begin at the
same starting point. If reproductive health care or marriage equality
is the contested issue, for example, then the discussion opens with the
constitutional principles of equal protection and due process. That
leaves citizens with plenty to debate, as many constitutional and legal
provisions are indeterminate.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb etseq. (2006).
642 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OUARTERLY [Vol. 42:4
In contrast, in the values model associated with Hobby Lobby,
individuals first consult their personal religions and philosophies
(what the late philosopher John Rawls called "comprehensive
doctrines"),' find their preferred answers therein, and then transform
those beliefs into law, even if their fellow citizens do not share those
beliefs and even if those beliefs restrict others' freedoms. Thus they
impose their comprehensive doctrines on one another through the
force of law.
Religious freedom cannot flourish in such a values-imposed
environment because individuals are forced to live by norms and
principles they do not share. Article VI and the First Amendment of
the Constitution should protect individuals from such tyranny. Yet
over the last sixty years too many interpretations of the Constitution
have been rooted in comprehensive doctrines instead of in law.
Today, the dominant account of judges, presidents, legislators, and
citizens is that they frequently apply or translate their personal beliefs
into public policy. The outcome of Hobby Lobby continues this
alarming trend, and demonstrates that civil rights are restricted
whenever comprehensive doctrines govern.
A. Interpreting the Constitution to Impose Personal Values
Imagine a room full of philosophers, political scientists,
economists, theologians, and historians trying to persuade you that
their discipline is superior and that it should make the laws for
everyone else. The battle over constitutional interpretation has been
similar to that scenario. Different comprehensive doctrines vied to
set the constitutional standard for everyone else by turning their
doctrines into law.
The Supreme Court's controversial decisions about school
desegregation, contraception, and abortion ramped up the debate
about constitutional values, and shifted the nation's attention toward
what was the best way to interpret the Constitution. In Brown v.
Board of Education, the Court ordered the desegregation of the
public schools.' In Griswold v. Connecticut, the Court identified a
privacy right of married couples to use contraceptives.' In Roe v.
Wade, the Court recognized a woman's right to decide whether to
bear a child.8
5. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 247 (1993).
6. 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
7. 381 U.S. 479,498-99 (1965).
8. 410 U.S. 113, 166 (1973).
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Critics of those rulings argued that the Court had pushed the
constitutional text beyond its given meaning.9 These critics argued
that if the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment accepted racial
segregation then it must be constitutional."o Although a law
forbidding the use of contraceptives might be "unwise, or even
asinine," they concluded, nothing in the Constitution prohibits it."
Similarly, they asserted that the right to abortion finds no support in
any constitutional text.12 Their argument developed that if
constitutional values do not support desegregation, contraception, or
abortion rights then the Justices had wrongly imposed their personal
values on the country in an undemocratic act of judicial activism.13
After Supreme Court Justices, especially members of the Warren
Court (1953-1969), were accused of imposing their own values on the
Constitution, a lengthy debate about the possibility of finding values
within the Constitution ensued.14 The discussion focused on whether
"judges deciding constitutional issues should confine themselves to
enforcing norms that are stated or clearly implicit in the written
Constitution ... [or] should go beyond that set of references and
enforce norms that cannot be discovered within the four corners of
the document."" In awkward and confusing academic terminology,
the group that followed the first strategy was labeled "interpretivist"
and the second "noninterpretivist," sometimes called "textualists"
and "supplementers."16 To put it in more direct language, they were
debating whether to find values in the Constitution or to impose them
on the Constitution from another source.
Both sides were critical of each other. Critics of
noninterpretivism pejoratively labeled it "constitutional
policymaking"' or "judicial activism."" The noninterpretivists,
9. Edwin Meese III, A Return to Constitutional Interpretation from Judicial Law-
Making, 40 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 925, 927 (1996).
10. RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY 166-92 (1977).
11. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
12. Critics from the left and right made this point. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The
Wages of Crying Wolf A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973).
13. Id.
14. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW (2002).
15. Id. at 1.
16. Thomas C. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 1-5 (1984).
17. MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 2
(1982) ("[A] species of policymaking, in which the Court decides, ultimately without
644 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OUARTERLY [Vol. 42:4
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however, insisted that the Constitution's text cannot answer all the
questions posed to it.'9 Some textual language-equal protection or
due process, for example-is so broad that its interpretation is not
self-evident. 20 Therefore, the answers must be sought elsewhere to
decide cases.
The location of the elsewhere was contested. Where can one
find a theory of values that clarifies the text of the Constitution?
Predictably, comprehensive doctrines were offered as a solution, and,
over time, constitutional theory became the battleground between the
comprehensive doctrines. Philosophy, political science, economics,
theology, and history all competed as candidates for the best
hermeneutic tool to discover-or create-constitutional values.
Constitutional theorists usually focused on the judge's role,
asking how judicial judgment could be enhanced by appealing to
external disciplines." The philosopher judge, the political scientist
judge, the economist judge, the theologian judge, and the historian
judge all vied for primacy.
Unsurprisingly, as the idea of judges appealing to comprehensive
doctrines became more acceptable, it transferred to presidents,
legislators, and citizens. Today, the dominant account of judges,
presidents, legislators, and citizens is that they frequently apply their
personal beliefs to legal and political questions. Now, citizens
regularly impose their religious and philosophical beliefs on one
another without regard for each other's rights.
Envisioning the judge as a philosopher, political scientist,
economist, theologian, or historian exposes the intellectual roots of
the imposition model of governance, where citizens impose their
fundamental values on each other instead of finding common ground
in the Constitution. In the following sections, I introduce you to the
philosopher judge, the political scientist judge, the economist judge,
the theologian judge, and the historian judge. The point is to remind
you that in my non-imposition model of constitutional interpretation,
it is best to be simply a judge.
reference to any value constitutionalized by the framers, which values among competing
values shall prevail and how those values shall be implemented.").
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. See ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 14, at 31. The Equal
Protection Clause, for example, is "a provision whose general concern-equality-is clear
enough but whose content beyond that cannot be derived from anything within [the
Constitution's] four corners or the known intentions of its framers." Id.
21. See generally id.
Summer 20151 645
1. The Philosopher Judge: Ronald Dworkin
Hercules is the most famous philosopher judge. Ronald
Dworkin created Hercules to illustrate how an ideal judge decides
cases.22 Hercules can decide easy cases by the constitutional text. To
resolve a hard case, however, Hercules must identify the overarching
principle that best fits the constitutional text and apply it with
integrity to his case.
In deciding whether the Establishment Clause allows a state to
provide busing to both religious and public school students,' for
example, Hercules confronts two possible interpretations of religious
liberty: "the right not to have one's taxes used for any purpose that
helps a religion to survive" or the right "not to have one's taxes used
to benefit one religion at the expense of another." 24 Because both
rules are plausible, Hercules must determine "which conception is a
more satisfactory elaboration of the general idea of religious
liberty." 25 Hercules is brilliant enough to discern the correct guiding
principle. Indeed, Hercules "always [has] a right answer-and that
answer is provided by the normative theory that best fit and justified
the law as a whole."26
Hercules' task in identifying the decisive principle is
straightforwardly philosophical. Even if the principle he selects is
only "second-best" 27 (because the best philosophical principle in the
world might be untethered to the Constitution), his job in crafting
principles depends upon good philosophy. Indeed, early in his career,
Hercules' Creator lamented the disconnect between moral
philosophy and the law and recommended the "fusion of
constitutional law and moral theory." 28  In 1975, Dworkin
recommended John Rawls's A Theory of Justice as a philosophical
theory that "no constitutional lawyer will be able to ignore."
Rawls's principle of justice as fairness-which included equal basic
22. See generally RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1978).
23. The question is based on the famous Supreme Court case, Everson v. Bd. of
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947), where the Court ruled that the busing did not violate the
Establishment Clause.
24. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 22, at 107.
25. Id.
26. Lawrence B. Solum, The Unity of Interpretation, 90 B.U. L. REV. 551, 554 (2010)
(symposium on Justice for Hedgehogs).
27. Id.
28. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 22, at 149.
29. Id.
646 [Vol. 42:4HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
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liberties, fair equality of opportunity, and the difference principle-
was thus relevant to constitutional law. 0
Dworkin urged constitutional law to "take rights seriously" and
make rights "part of its own agenda."31 Presumably no one could be
of more help in setting that agenda than Rawls, the Harvard
philosopher who had revolutionized the philosophical world by
expounding a theory of justice that upset the dominant utilitarian
school and defended the priority of the right over the good.32 Thus,
Rawlsian moral and political philosophy served Dworkin's vision of a
"moral reading of the Constitution" that could replace legal
positivism's disconnect between law and morality.
2. The Political Scientist Judge: John Hart Ely
Law professor John Hart Ely quickly debunked Dworkin's
philosophical reading of the Constitution by wryly imagining its effect
on a Supreme Court decision: "We like Rawls, you like Nozick. We
win, 6-3. Statute invalidated."3 4 Like Rawls, Robert Nozick was a
Harvard philosopher. Nozick, however, attacked Rawls's ideas and
defended a more libertarian reading of the state and private property
in Anarchy, State, and Utopia." As Ely shrewdly noted, the two
philosophers "reach very different conclusions. There simply does
not exist a method of moral philosophy.... The Constitution may
follow the flag, but is it really supposed to keep up with the New York
Review of Books?""
Ely's gibe identified a salient criticism of philosophical judges. A
philosophical basis for the Constitution ends in a choice among
philosophers. One could choose John Locke, Jeremy Bentham, John
Stuart Mill, John Rawls or Ronald Dworkin.3 7 Critics of Rawls and
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
33. RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM'S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE
CONSTITUTION (1997).
34. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 14, at 58.
35. ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974).
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, TOLERATION AND THE CONSTITUTION (1986);
DAVID A. J. RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM (1989)
(political philosophy of the Founders was clearly Lockean); David A. J. Richards,
Constitutional Privacy, The Right to Die and the Meaning of Life: A Moral Analysis, 22
WM. & MARY L. REV. 327 (1981) (applying moral theory to right to die and privacy
cases).
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Dworkin reasserted the utilitarianism of Jeremy Bentham and John
Stuart Mill. Dworkin defended himself against the charge of
imposing his philosophy on the Constitution, arguing, for example,
that although his political views favored some redistribution of
wealth, the Constitution could not be read to support economic
justice.38 Ely opposed all such attempts to impose philosophy on the
Constitution.
Ely opposed attempts to read substantive values into the
Constitution, favoring process over substance. In Democracy and
Distrust, Ely argued it is undemocratic for judges to impose their own
substantive values on the Constitution. Instead, they should do what
judges do best, namely keep the processes of democracy working
while the people and their representatives appropriately make their
own decisions about values.
Unlike rights theorists like Dworkin, Ely "ask[ed] us to focus not
on whether this or that substantive value is unusually important or
fundamental, but rather on whether the opportunity to participate
either in the political processes by which values are appropriately
identified and accommodated, or in the accommodations those
processes have reached, has been unduly constricted.""
Ely's process theory, which was based on a famous footnote in a
Supreme Court decision, authorized the courts to protect democratic
participation through "representation reinforcement."" Thus, judges
are referees who police the process of representation rather than
players who identify substantive values. In other words, each judge is
a mere mortal, not Hercules; judges are not philosophers, but simply
judges. Specifically, Ely's judge monitors situations in which:
(1) the ins are choking off the channels of political
change to ensure that they will stay in and the outs will
stay out, or (2) though no one is actually denied a
voice or a vote, representatives beholden to an
effective majority are systematically disadvantaging
some minority out of simple hostility or a prejudiced
38. See ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 14, at 36; see also Jack M.
Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Law and the Humanities: An Uneasy Relationship, 18 YALE
J.L. & HUMAN. 155, 181 (2006) ("By the mid-1990s, Dworkin himself argued that not even
Hercules-Dworkin's name for his 'ideal' judge-could legitimately find Michelman's
theory of rights for the poor in the United States Constitution even though it was what
liberal political theory required.").
39. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST, supra note 14, at 77.
40. See generally id.
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refusal to recognize commonalities of interest, and
thereby denying that minority the protection afforded
other groups by a representative system.41
The philosophers immediately struck back, labeling Ely a
political scientist or, even worse, a utilitarian philosopher. 42  They
insisted that Ely had snuck his own substantive theory into the
Constitution by privileging participation and democracy over other
values like human rights.43 Ely's judge was secretly a political
scientist, not a neutral referee, because he had to figure out how
democracy works. Because the Constitution does not define
democracy, Ely's judge had to "appeal to critical political theory" to
give the word meaning." Moreover, only a political scientist could
"determine when the channels of political change are blocked or a
group is the victim of improper stereotyping." 45
Critics then charged that Ely, a constitutional lawyer, was a poor
political scientist." Judge Richard Posner, who led the movement to
incorporate economic analysis into law, argued that the flaws in
Democracy and Distrust were "also weaknesses at the level of
political and social theory."4  Critics lamented that Ely did not even
bother to cite political science, economics, or public choice theory.'
According to Posner, only social science can teach judges about the
"design of political institutions" or the "effects of apportionment, the
political dynamics of affirmative action, the conditions for effective
minority politics, the significance of conflicting interests within a
group (housewives and working women, for example, have sharply
different economic interests), the force of inertia in the political
41. Id. at 103.




45. David A. Strauss, Modernization and Representation Reinforcement: An Essay in
Memory of John Hart Ely, 57 STAN. L. REV. 761, 777 (2004); RONALD DWORKIN, A
MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 34 (1985).
46. Richard A. Posner, Democracy and Distrust Revisited, 77 VA. L. REV. 641, 648
(1991).
47. Id.
48. See id. at 649 (Once Ely picked a constitutional text, he was "off and running.. .
[b]ut to run well, you need more social science than Ely deploys in Democracy and
Distrust.").
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process." 4 9  Without scientific data, Ely was merely another
philosopher like Dworkin, imposing his own comprehensive doctrine
on the Constitution without even understanding his comprehensive
doctrine very well.
Other critics insisted that Ely's principle of representation
reinforcement was philosophically utilitarian because it weighed and
balanced political interests.o In determining whether the political
process was fair, Professor David A. J. Richards insisted Ely's judge
would "maximize the aggregate of satisfaction over frustration of
interests, and judicial review assures that the interests are given their
proper utilitarian weight."" As rights philosophers, Dworkin and
Rawls had, of course, long opposed utilitarian philosophy. They had
established their reputations by attacking utilitarianism's dominance
in moral and political philosophy and constitutional law. To them,
Ely was just another utilitarian philosopher, balancing interests under
a scheme to maximize pleasure, satisfaction, or happiness, and
therefore imposing his (misguided) utilitarian values on the
Constitution.
3. The Economist Judge: Richard Posner
Posner, the economist judge, rejected both utilitarianism and
fundamental rights in favor of law and economics. Economists,
Posner complained, were frequently equated with utilitarians and
then derided and dismissed.52  Posner, however, argued that
economics and utilitarian philosophy are not alike. Economists and
utilitarians employ different methods of analysis and promote
different values. Economics uses empirical tools that measure costs
in monetary terms; utilitarianism begins with philosophical ideas.
Economics promotes welfare; utilitarianism calculates happiness
aggregated across society." Economics balances costs; utilitarianism
weighs utilitarian values.
49. Id. at 650.
50. RICHARDS, FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM, supra note 37,
at 254.
51. Id.
52. Richard A. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL
STUD. 103 (1979); Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111
HARV. L. REV. 1637, 1647 (1998) ("[E]conomic theory deals with observable social
behaviors, such as price movements, firm size, input costs, output, shortages, wages,
methods of compensation of employees and other agents, capital investments, population
growth, and industrial output.").
53. Id.
650 [Vol. 42:4
To clarify the point that economic welfare is different from
utilitarian happiness, Posner defined the value behind economics as
"wealth maximization" and argued that wealth maximization
"provides a ... basis for a normative theory of law."5 4 Economics,
therefore, provides a better theory of judging than utilitarian or
Kantian philosophy." Unlike the utilitarian philosopher judge who
weighed and balanced different interests against one another, or the
Kantian judge who defended the dignity of the human person, the
economist judge was a "rational, self-interested utility maximizer""
who enhanced wealth.57
Posner was especially harsh in his criticism of "academic
moralists,"" and denounced "Dworkin and his allies [as] the Taliban
of Western legal thought"5 9 for merging their own moral theories with
law. Academic moralists inappropriately impose their own moral
ends on the Constitution, he argued, while economists provide the
appropriate means to the goals set by law.W To "advise a person (or,
for that matter, an entire society) about the consequences of
alternative paths to the goal that the person or society has chosen is
not to commit oneself to a moral view." 61
The pragmatic Posner (a sitting federal judge) questioned the
effectiveness of the philosophers' and political scientists'
comprehensive theories in the world of real judging: "few judges (few
anybody) are equipped to create or even evaluate comprehensive
political theories." 2 Nonetheless, some room for personal values in
judging remains as long as they are "yoked to empirical data."63
According to Posner, "most judges can handle facts better than they
can handle theories."" On that ground, empirical economics was
superior to other disciplines that theorized without practical result.
54. Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, supra note 52, at 103.
55. Id. at 119.
56. RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 35 (2008).
57. For Posner's criticism of Ely, see Posner, Democracy and Distrust Revisited, supra
note 46, at 643.
58. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, supra note 52, at 1638.
59. Id. at 1695.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 1669.
62. Richard A. Posner, Legal Reasoning From the Top Down and From the Bottom
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Philosophers pushed back, arguing that economic analysis cannot
protect fundamental rights or defend against utilitarian values, the
original goal of Dworkin and Hercules.
4. The Theologian Judge: Stephen Carter
With philosopher, political scientist, and economist judges hard
at work, it was inevitable for theologian judges to demand their turn
in the spotlight. The theologians' dominant argument was about
fairness: if philosophers, political scientists and economists could
impose their personal values on the Constitution, then theologians
must be allowed to do so as well. This theological demand for
fairness was crucial in inspiring the religious revival that led to Hobby
Lobby.
The new theologians challenged the traditional separationist
account of judges, which was rooted in the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment and required judges to separate their faith from
their legal work." Over many years of Senate confirmation hearings,
Catholic Supreme Court nominees as liberal as William Brennan,
moderate as Anthony Kennedy, and conservative as Antonin Scalia
had all pledged to follow the Constitution over Catholicism and to
resign if the two conflicted. Thus, they renounced their
comprehensive doctrines in favor of the Constitution.
Yale Law professor Stephen Carter disputed the unofficial
requirement that the "religiously devout judge" must promise
separation.' If many judges relied on other personal values in
deciding cases, and if Hercules could rely on philosophy, then
religious values should not be banned under a proper reading of the
Establishment Clause. Separation, Carter argued, "carries an implicit
trivialization of religious faith, and a denigration of religion as against
65. Sanford Levinson, Is It Possible to Have a Serious Discussion About Religious
Commitment and Judicial Responsibilities?, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 280, 283 (2006)
(describing Scalia saying he would resign if faith conflicted with law and fortunately
church's teaching on death penalty is not binding); id. at 287 (religion played almost no
role in Alito and Roberts confirmations); Sanford Levinson, The Confrontation of
Religious Faith and Civil Religion: Catholics Becoming Justices, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 1047
(1990) (general background to confirmation hearings); id. at 1063 (Brennan oath to
support the Constitution); id. at 1064 (Scalia); id. at 1065 (Kennedy). But see Scott C.
Idleman, Private Conscience, Public Duties: The Unavoidable Conflicts Facing a Catholic
Justice, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 312 (2006) (identifying that there are real conflicts for
Catholic justices).
66. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, The Religiously Devout Judge, 64 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 932, 943 (1989); see also Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Catholic and Evangelical Supreme
Court Justices: A Theological Analysis, 4 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 296,309 (2006).
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other ways of knowing."67 Fairness required that religion be treated
equally.
Carter contrasted the traditionally separatist objective, neutral
judge with the reality of the "morally sensitive judge."6 Carter
agreed with Dworkin that the traditional separatist judge, who
ignored moral values, was unable to protect fundamental rights. Like
Hercules, Carter's morally sensitive judge brought moral values-
religious or nonreligious, without discrimination-to bear on hard
cases. "The idea, in short, is to treat all moral knowledge as one and
once we decide to allow judges to rely on it, not to be fussy about its
source." 69  Every judge is treated alike. Christianity is as good as
Kantianism in resolving hard questions of law.
Some judges decided cases on religious grounds.o Just as
Hercules found guidance in moral philosophy, some theologian
judges pursued Christian values in opposing contraception, abortion,
and women's equality." Most theologians agreed that religion was
necessary only for the hard cases because law resolved the easy ones.
They disagreed, however, about how explicit the appeal to religion
should be.
Columbia law professor Kent Greenawalt, for example, argued
that a judge might base her ruling on religious beliefs when the law is
indeterminate.72 If interpretation of an environmental statute
depends on the abstract issue of what duties we owe to nature,
religion may resolve the controversy. However, Greenawalt was
67. Carter, supra note 66, at 933; see also Kent Greenawalt, The Use of Religious
Convictions by Legislators and Judges, 36 J. CHURCH & STATE 541, 545 (1994) ("[For
reasons of fairness, and because a religious person can hardly ask what are her personal
moral convictions apart from her religion, judges will sometimes appropriately take their
own religious convictions into account."); Kent Greenawalt, Some Problems With Public
Reason in John Rawls's Political Liberalism, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1303 (1995).
68. Carter, supra note 66, at 933.
69. Id. at 943.
70. William H. Pryor, Jr., The Religious Faith and Judicial Duty of an American
Catholic Judge, 24 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 347, 355-56 (2006) (the actual Catholic judge
here says he subscribes to Carter's model of the objective judge and not to the morally
sensitive one).
71. Raul A. Gonzalez, Climbing the Ladder of Success-My Spiritual Journey, 27
TEX. TECH L. REV. 1139 (1996) (identifying nine actual cases where his religion affected
him); Wendell L. Griffen, The Case for Religious Values in Judicial Decision-Making, 81
MARQ. L. REV. 513, 515 (1998) ("[Jjudges are Value-Sensitive People in a Value-Ridden
Process"); id. at 516 ("it is unrealistic to demand that a person who is sincere in her
religious conviction disown or discount that conviction when she assumes judicial office").
72. Greenawalt, The Use of Religious Convictions by Legislators and Judges, supra
note 67, at 545.
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"extremely wary" about allowing judges to rely on religious premises,
so he insisted that the judge's written decision stand on public reasons
and not on religious grounds." Thus, religion could authentically
provide a judicial answer but not provide the written grounds for
justification.74 Michael Perry objected, arguing that Greenawalt's
solution violated the rule of law: "That judges conceal that they have
relied on a controversial premise, including a religious premise, is
deeply problematic, as is the proposition that they should do so.""
Behind Greenawalt's and Perry's dispute lay a much broader
potential controversy among theologian judges. Did Greenawalt
unintentionally favor religions that could or would translate faith into
public reason? Would Perry's approach allow court opinions to be
full of particular religious references, perhaps religions unshared by
the parties to the case?76 Would only certain types of religious
argument be acceptable? Favoritism among religions is always
problematic under the Establishment Clause. Once the courtroom
door opens to one theologian judge, the rest must follow no matter
what type of arguments they offer.
Theologians successfully convinced Americans that principles of
fairness allow religious groups to impose their comprehensive
doctrines, even in judicial opinions. Their success was a direct
precursor to Hobby Lobby.
5. The Historian Judge: Antonin Scalia
Devout Roman Catholic Supreme Court Justice Antonin Scalia
rejected the theological model of judges. Unlike the theologian
judges, Scalia famously pledged to resign if his faith conflicted with
73. KENT GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 239-
41 (1988); see also Greenawalt, The Use of Religious Convictions by Legislators and
Judges, supra note 67, at 545 ("[J]udges may sometimes appropriately rely on personal
moral convictions even though their opinions make it seem as if they are relying only on
sources available in the same way to all judges."); id. at 549 ("[S]hared premises and forms
of reasoning have priority; these will get judges all of the way in some cases but not in
others. Thus, even though my category of personal moral convictions is narrower than
Carter's, I agree with him that sometimes judges will have to rely on personal moral
convictions.").
74. KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS 150
(1995).
75. MICHAEL J. PERRY, RELIGION IN POLITICS: CONSTITUTIONAL AND MORAL
PERSPECTIVES 104 (1997).
76. In his general theory described in Religion in Politics, Perry had required
ecumenical political dialogue that put some limits on religious argument in terms of
making it accessible to everyone. Id. at 78-79.
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his oath of office." Scalia is an originalist judge who prefers the
objective, neutral model of judging to the morally sensitive judge or
Hercules.7 ' He led the Originalism movement that contested the
personal values claims of the philosophers, political scientists,
economists, and theologians by claiming to find a personal-value-free
source in history. I call him a historian judge for reasons that follow.
Originalists sought to expel personal values from constitutional
interpretation by focusing on the original Constitution. Originalism
has survived many stages. The first wave (Old Originalism) focused
on original intent, arguing that judges should learn the intent of the
Framers at the time they drafted the Constitution and use it to
interpret the Constitution today.79  The Framers' intent would
therefore replace the judge's personal values as a source of law.
Original Intent Originalism was "a negative and reactive
theory"80 whose main political goal was to criticize the liberal
decisions of the Warren Court. Its theoretical flaws were quickly
spotted. Which Framers' intents would be studied, and how would
they be discovered? Even the best historical scholarship was
inconclusive about such questions. Moreover, the Ratifiers' intent,
critics insisted, was more legally binding than the Framers', and yet
more elusive for historical recovery." Even the brightest historian
judge could not reconstruct James Madison's intentions, or George
Mason's, or William Pierce's, or those of the Members of the
Massachusetts Ratifying Convention, or Theophilus Parsons, or
Virginians, or New Yorkers, etc.
The New Originalists replaced the Framers' and Ratifiers' intent
with Public Meaning Originalism, which examines the "objective
textual meaning measured by the hypothetical understanding of a
reasonable person at the time of the framing."8 2 As Georgetown
Professor Lawrence Solum explains, New Originalism combines the
77. Levinson, The Confrontation of Religious Faith and Civil Religion, supra note 65,
at 1076 (Scalia is "especially dramatic insofar as it appears to be an unusually broad
abnegation of the role of moral analysis in constitutional decisionmaking").
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Two (More) Problems with Originalism, 31 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 907, 909 (2008); see generally Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original
Understanding, 60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980).
80. Peter J. Smith, How Different Are Originalism and Non-Originalism?, 62
HASTINGS L.J. 707, 712 (2011).
81. See Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239
(2009).
82. Smith, supra note 80, at 713.
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"fixation thesis" with the "constraint principle"; because "the
[original] meaning of each constitutional provision is determined [i.e.,
fixed] at the time the text was written and adopted," the judge is
constrained to adopt it." Justice Scalia allegedly initiated the
movement from the Doctrine of Original Intent to the Doctrine of
Original Meaning.'
Scalia acknowledged that the original meaning judge must
examine "an enormous mass of material," including the constitutional
text and structure, old dictionaries, state debates about ratification,
and constitutions, contemporaneous understanding (especially of the
Framers and the First Congress) as well as the "political and
intellectual atmosphere of the time."" Although Scalia conceded that
this task is "sometimes better suited to the historian than the
lawyer,"8 he nonetheless favored this approach to judging because it
replaces the personal preferences of the judge with the objective
meaning of the Constitution. An originalist judge is not a philosopher
judge. Scalia's explanation of the Eighth Amendment clarifies the
difference:
[T]he principle underlying the Eighth Amendment "is
not a moral principle of 'cruelty' that philosophers can
play with in the future, but rather the existing society's
assessment of what is cruel. It means not. . . 'whatever
may be considered cruel from one generation to the
next,' but 'what we consider cruel today [i.e., in 1791]';
otherwise it would be no protection against the moral
perceptions of a future, more brutal generation. It is,
in other words, rooted in the moral perceptions of the
time.""
83. Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Fidelity: Originalism and the Possibility of
Constitutional Redemption, 91 TEX. L. REV. 147, 154 (2012).
84. Lawrence B. Solum, District of Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, 103 Nw. U.
L. REV. 923, 933 (2009).
85. Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 852, 856
(1988).
86. Id. at 857.
87. Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291, 296
(2007) (quoting Antonin Scalia, Response, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 129, 140 (Amy Guttman ed., 1997)); see also Solum, District of
Columbia v. Heller and Originalism, supra note 84, at 952 (In order to figure out that
original meaning, the judge asks "How would the Constitution of 1789 have been
understood by a competent speaker of American English at the time it was adopted?");
see Bret Boyce, Heller, McDonald and Originalism, 2010 CARDOZO L. REV. DE NOVo 2, 4
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Thus, constitutional interpretation is rooted in history, not
philosophy; in fixed meaning, not living text.
The philosophers, political scientists, economists, and some
authentic historians resisted Originalism. The Original Public
Meaning approach suggests that linguistic history is determinate. As
with Original Intent Originalism, however, history is not up to the
task of Original Public Meaning. If varying definitions of
constitutional text existed at the time of drafting, then the judge
might not be able to discover just one "fixed" meaning." He might
have to choose arbitrarily between two concurrent interpretations. In
doing so, he would be considering individuals' conceptions of words,
which is no different from searching for original intent.8 9 Even more
strangely, he might prefer "a hypothetical author's intended meaning
(the meaning the hypothetical member of the public would
erroneously assume was intended by the actual authors) over the
actual authors' intended meaning."'
Despite the high hopes of the Originalists, "linguistic facts" are
not so clear that they can be interpreted without some sense of the
hypothetical or historical interpreter. Thus, the historian judge
inevitably creates a fictional interpreter, a creature of his imagination,
a historical Hercules. Given that the "natural tendency for any
interpreter [is] to think that the founding generations were composed
(2010) ("The theoreticians of public meaning originalism avoid the messy historical
inquiry into how the adopters actually understood a given provision, and instead focus on
how a fictitious competent speaker would have understood the provision as determined by
'conventional semantic meaning,' the 'rules of syntax,' and other evidence of
contemporary usage.").
88. Kramer, supra note 79, at 912 ("You are deciding what principles should have
been used in the eighteenth century to determine public meaning, because those principles
were never settled.").
89. See Tara Smith, Originalism's Misplaced Fidelity: "Original" Meaning is Not
Objective, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 1, 55 (2009) (Original meaning "interprets law's language
to reflect only the actual, inevitably limited conceptions of words' meanings held by the
public at a particular date. If we take the meaning of law's words to be merely what
certain people's words meant to them-those individuals' conceptions, no more and no
less-we revert to the mind-reading games and variability that sank the Original Intent
school."); id. at 5 n.20 ("collapses into subjectivism"); id. at 56 ("What all Originalists fail
to appreciate is that the popular understanding of certain words, however accurately we
come to understand what that understanding actually was at a given date, remains a fact
fundamentally about consciousnesses, rather than about reality. Consequently, it cannot
sustain the objective rule of law.").
90. Jack N. Rakove, Joe the Ploughman Reads the Constitution, or, the Poverty of
Public Meaning Originalism, 48 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 575, 582-83 (2011) (quoting Larry
Alexander).
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of smart, sensible people like-well, the interpreter himself,"" many
of Justice Scalia's decisions in fact reflect his personal values while
claiming basis only in the text of the Constitution.
Judge Posner also questioned the Originalists for applying their
theories to the Constitution. Posner observed that although Robert
Bork-one of the first Originalists, who was rejected by the Senate
after President Reagan nominated him to the Supreme Court-
always opposed the use of moral philosophy in law, he was clearly
"under the sway of a moral philosopher," namely Thomas Hobbes.93
The historian judge thus imposes a different era's comprehensive
doctrine on his colleagues, but that comprehensive doctrine is no less
comprehensive than the philosophical, political, economic and
theological accounts.
Even if a modern judge could work the Originalist method to
find the accurate historical interpretation of the Constitution, he still
faces the "dead hand" objection, which asks why Americans in 2015
should be governed only by the ideas of eighteenth-century men.94
Indeed, the absence of women and slaves from most reports of the
original Constitution represents a dead hand plus problem, leaving
today's diverse society to be ruled by the religions and philosophies of
a small group of men, the "earlier men." 9
From my perspective, Originalism became another instance, like
philosophy, political science, economics, and theology, in which a
comprehensive doctrine-belonging to an actual Framer or Ratifier, a
hypothetical reader, or the judge himself-is applied to the
Constitution.
Envisioning the judge as a philosopher, political scientist,
economist, theologian, or historian exposes the intellectual roots of
the imposition model of governance, where citizens impose their
fundamental values on each other instead of finding common ground
in the Constitution. In contrast, my non-imposition model speaks
simply of the judge.
91. David A. Strauss, Originalism, Conservatism and Judicial Restraint, 34 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 137, 143 (2011); see also Rakove, supra note 90, at 586 ("[T]he
imaginary disinterested original reader of the Constitution remains nothing more nor less
than a creature of the modern originalist jurist's imagination.").
92. See generally BRUCE MURPHY, SCALIA: A COURT OF ONE (2014).
93. Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365,1372 (1990).
94. Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV.
277, 357 (1985).
95. Smith, Originalism's Misplaced Fidelity, supra note 89, at 55.
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6. The Judge: John Rawls
As noted above, during the 1970s and 1980s Harvard philosopher
John Rawls's A Theory of Justice was widely recommended by
philosopher judges as a valuable source of insight about fundamental
rights and the United States Constitution.' The same philosophers
and theologians later rejected Rawls's warning that comprehensive
doctrines do not provide the basis for constitutional law and politics."
Rawls's 1993 book, Political Liberalism, challenged the dominant
account of constitutional theory that judges appropriately apply their
personal comprehensive doctrines to legal and political questions.'
The widespread rejection of Rawls's argument confirmed that
applying personal moral values to the Constitution was taken for
granted as a matter of fairness and common sense, and that the non-
imposition model of constitutional values had dropped from view by
the 1990s.'
Rawls argued that law and policy should be based on "public
reason," not comprehensive doctrines, and that everyone, including
judges, politicians, legislators, and citizens, should rely on public
reason in deciding constitutional essentials and matters of basic
justice.'" Public reason is quite demanding, especially for adherents
of strong comprehensive doctrines. In discussing constitutional
essentials and matters of basic justice, public reason says "we are not
to appeal to comprehensive religious and philosophical doctrines-to
what we as individuals or members of associations see as the whole
truth."'1 Instead, citizens should be guided by "what principles and
guidelines we think other citizens (who are also free and equal) may
reasonably be expected to endorse along with us."10
96. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE, supra note 32.
97. Leslie C. Griffin, Good Catholics Should Be Rawlsian Liberals, 5 S. CAL.
INTERDISC. L.J. 297, n.24-54 and accompanying text (1997).
98. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 5.
99. For critical treatment of this concept, see generally Kent Greenawalt, On Public
Reason, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 669 (1994); Lawrence B. Solum, Constructing An Ideal of
Public Reason, 30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 729 (1993); Peter de Marneffe, Rawls's Idea of
Public Reason, 75 PAC. PHIL. Q. 232 (1994); Lawrence B. Solum, Inclusive Public Reason,
75 PAC. PHIL. Q. 217 (1994); Kent Greenawalt, Some Problems With Public Reason in
John Rawls's Political Liberalism, 28 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1303 (1995); Elizabeth H.
Wolgast, The Demands of Public Reason, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1936 (1994).
100. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 5, at 224-26 (1993).
101. Id. at 224-25.
102. Id.; see also JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 1 (Paper Ed.) ("This ideal is
that citizens are to conduct their public political discussions of constitutional essentials and
matters of basic justice within the framework of what each sincerely regards as a
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Endorse is the key word; I may understand that President Obama
governs from Christian principles because he is a committed
Christian, but I cannot be expected to endorse Christian government
if I am not Christian. I may understand that Hercules is a committed
Kantian, but cannot endorse government based on Kantian principles,
especially if I am a utilitarian or an economist. Whenever citizens
vote their Christianity or Kantianism into law, Rawls argued, they
coerce their fellow citizens to obey those beliefs and thus use
"unreasonable force" against them. 3 Rawls thus captured the non-
imposition model of the Constitution in the philosophical language of
public reason.
Rawls identified Supreme Court Justices as exemplars of public
reason and argued that public reasons were obligatory in judicial
opinions as well as in legislation and voting.' In contrast to
Greenawalt, who allowed judges to reason from religious premises, or
Perry, who encouraged judges to include whatever reasoning they
used, Rawls insisted that "public reasons should guide decision as
well as debate and opinion writing."' 05
The criticisms of Rawlsian public reason were extensive.
Professors Perry, Dworkin, Greenawalt, and Carter were among the
harshest detractors. Three recurring complaints were that public
reason was unfair, impractical, and impossible. Public reason was
unfair because religion was shut out of the marketplace of ideas,
impractical because politics depends upon appeals to comprehensive
doctrines, and impossible because individuals cannot put aside their
personal beliefs." Dworkin, in particular, argued "liberals will not
reasonable political conception of justice, a conception that expresses political values that
others as free and equal also might reasonably be expected reasonably [sic] to endorse.").
103. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 5, at 247. But see Miriam Galston,
Rawlsian Dualism and the Autonomy of Political Thought, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1842 (1994)
(arguing against Rawls's assumptions that comprehensive doctrines that dictate political
outcomes are unreasonable).
104. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 5, at 216. See generally Samuel
Freeman, Political Liberalism and the Possibility of a Just Democratic Constitution, 69
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 619, 656 (1994) (noting that public reason is hypocritical if it allows
individuals to "vote their personal preferences and comprehensive views with impunity,"
and suggesting that Greenawalt must allow for this).
105. Greenawalt, On Public Reason, supra note 99, at 677-79.
106. For the point that public reason is restrictive, see Galston, supra note 103, at 1844
(noting "how exclusionary his political theory in fact is in its characterization of certain
comprehensive views [both religious and non-religious] as unreasonable"); Michael J.
Sandel, Political Liberalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1776 (1994) ("[Public reason] is an
unduly severe restriction that would impoverish political discourse and rule out important
dimensions of public deliberation"); id. at 1790, 1791 ("restrictive character of liberal
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succeed if they ask people of faith to set aside their religious
convictions when they take up the role of citizens.""o7 Greenawalt was
even more direct, arguing that "ordinary people" cannot leave aside
their comprehensive doctrines absent "exceptional discipline,"'8
which is not an every day occurrence.
Rejecting public reason, the comprehensive theorists
(unsurprisingly) argued that political debate should take place
according to the arguments of comprehensive doctrines. Liberals,
Dworkin recommended, "must try to show religious conservatives
that their ambition to fuse religion and politics in the way they now
propose is an error because it contradicts very basic principles that
are also part of their faith. Conservatives must try to show liberals
that they are wrong in that judgment."'" In other words, citizens
should battle over faith.
public reason"); Wolgast, supra note 99, at 1943 (arguing that in the context of the passage
of a law on inoculation for children opposed by a Christian Science congressman, Rawls's
approach deprives individuals of the "considerable power" and "passion" of religious
argument. "Framed in this cooler, more legalistic way, some of its power has certainly
been lost."). See generally Gary C. Leedes, Rawls' Excessively Secular Political
Conception, 27 U. RICH. L. REV. 1083, 1104 (1993) (book review) ("This kind of
discriminatory treatment is unlikely to end the culture wars between many Americans and
their adversaries including Christian fundamentalists, Islamic fundamentalists,
conservative Catholics, and Orthodox Jews. Rawls is in cloud-cuckoo land if he thinks
that religious disagreements will be reduced in number by a political theory that
stigmatizes devout persons whose political opinions are consistently aligned with their
religious orientation.").
107. RONALD DWORKIN, IS DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE?: PRINCIPLES FOR A NEW
POLITICAL DEBATE 65 (2006).
108. KENT GREENAWALT, PRIVATE CONSCIENCES AND PUBLIC REASONS, supra
note 74, at 138 (arguing that the rare person who managed to separate perspectives would
inevitably question whether her political opponent was doing the same in good faith, and
eventually become skeptical about "neutral" accounts of political debate because of
growing mistrust of her interlocutors); id. at 138 ("If someone is conscientiously trying to
purge his own position of religious or comprehensive views, but finds (surprisingly) that
his position ends up being the one that fits best with those overall views, how far is he
going to believe that his opponents have managed to discount their comprehensive
views?"); id. ("people are likely to feel that if they try too hard, they will be unfairly
disadvantaging the comprehensive views from which they begin."); id. at 138-39 ("It is
demanding a great deal to ask people strenuously to aim to distance themselves from their
comprehensive views when they will inevitably suspect that their political opponents are
failing to do so."); see also Kent Greenawalt, Religion and Public Reasons: Making Laws
and Evaluating Candidates, 27 J.L. & POL. 387, 392 (2012) (Repeating the earlier point that
it applies to public justification, not actual reasoning: "If most people are not really
capable of excising all their religious understandings from their political positions, it would
be unwise to insist that they do so.").
109. DWORKIN, Is DEMOCRACY POSSIBLE HERE?, supra note 107, at 65.
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The politicians agreed. Thus, we suffer from the current political
environment, where politicians express their religious views openly,
or translate them into more public language, and then expect their
comprehensive doctrines to provide common ground for the 260
million people of the United States, who subscribe to 350,000
religious congregations, and the 50 million who affiliate with no
religion at all."
While comprehensive constitutional theory encouraged
comprehensive doctrine-based judging, it was the politicians who
grabbed the values theories and ran with them, thereby creating the
faith-based politics that led to Hobby Lobby.
B. Faith-Based Politics
Ironically, our contemporary faith-based politics arose in
response to President Jimmy Carter, a devout Christian who by
Southern Baptist faith believed in "absolute and total separation of
church and state." 1 ' Carter modeled his early political career after
President John F. Kennedy, the nation's first and only Roman
Catholic president, who won non-Catholic voters' confidence in a
famous 1960 campaign speech when he pledged to obey the
Constitution, not the pope, and to resign if his faith conflicted with his
oath of office."2 Carter took the Kennedy separationist pledge when
he ran for president in 1976.
1. The Rise of Faith-Based Politics from Presidents Jimmy Carter to
Barack Obama
Carter placed Christianity at the heart of his political identity and
at the core of his presidency in a more open manner than previous
presidents, especially by repeatedly describing what it meant to be a
born-again Christian.13 In 1976, in a close victory over President
110. Greenawalt, Religion and Public Reasons, supra note 108, at 393 (Consistent with
his position on judging, Greenawalt was less certain about open religious advocacy,
thinking that everyone could rely on religious premises without stating them publicly:
"This does involve some sacrifice in candor, but I believe that is a relatively minor concern
about the candor of public officials, and an acceptable cost.").
111. Interview by Ralph Blodgett with Jimmy Carter, in The Church and the State,
LIBERTY, Sept./Oct. 1976, reprinted in JIMMY CARTER, 1 THE PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN
1976 974-76 (1976); Carter Reassures Jews, Facts on File World News Digest, 1976
DIGEST, at 410 n.3.
112. Transcript: JFK's Speech on His Religion, NPR (Dec. 5, 2007), available at
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyd=16920600.
113. See, e.g., Jimmy Carter, Judge Not, ATLANTA JOURNAL-CONSTITUTION, Feb. 27,
1996, at A17; John Rivera, Jimmy Carter's Mission in Life: Religion: Former President
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Gerald Ford, Carter became the first Democrat since Harry Truman
to carry the Southern Baptist vote and won over a significant number
of Protestant evangelical voters who traditionally voted Republican."4
The Evangelicals, however, quickly became disaffected with
Carter's policies. Evangelicals did not support eliminating tax
exemptions for religious schools that discriminated on the basis of
race, restricting government funding of religious schools, opposing
prayer in public schools, and enforcing the constitutional right to
abortion. In other words, the Evangelicals were disappointed that the
Christian Carter's policies were not pro-Christian and Christian-
based."' In protest, they formed the organizations of the new
Christian Right and sought candidates whose views were in line with
their own."6 As a result of their dissatisfaction with Jimmy Carter's
presidential choices, Ronald Reagan gained the religious and
evangelical vote in the 1980 election."'
The Christian Right targeted abortion rights. Religious battles
over abortion heated up in the late 1970s due to a vigorous anti-Roe
campaign by the nation's Catholic bishops, who wanted their
reproductive values, not the Supreme Court's, to govern the nation."'
In 1980, when Reagan defeated Carter, the Republican Party's
platform pledged for the first time to appoint judges "who respect
traditional family values and the sanctity of innocent human life.".
Sanctity, of course, is a religious word invoking the sacred, holy or
saintly. The platform's goal was for judges to start with their vision of
sanctity and apply it to the law as the bishops and other Christians
wanted. Since 1980, the nomination of federal judges has become
Brings His "Living Faith," Decades of Lessons from His Sunday School Lectures, to
Baltimore, BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 21, 1997, at 1E.
114. TIMOTHY A. BYRNES, CATHOLIC BISHOPS IN AMERICAN POLITICS 84 (1993);
Leo P. Ribuffo, God and Jimmy Carter, in TRANSFORMING FAITH: THE SACRED AND
SECULAR IN MODERN AMERICAN HISTORY 146 (M. L. Bradbury & James B. Gilbert,
eds., 1989).
115. See generally MATTHEW C. MOEN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE CHRISTIAN
RIGHT IN THE 1980s (2008).
116. Id.
117. Albert J. Menendez, Religion at the Polls, 1980, 33 CHURCH & STATE 15 (1980)
(Carter received only 40% of the Catholic and Baptist vote); ROBERT BOOTH FOWLER &
ALAN D. HERTZKE, RELIGION AND POLITICS IN AMERICA: FAITH, CULTURE, AND
STRATEGIC CHOICES 103 (4th ed. 2009) (Carter received 64% of the Jewish vote).
118. See generally PATRICIA MILLER, GOOD CATHOLICS: THE BATTLE OVER
ABORTION IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH (2014).
119. Republican Nat'l Comm., The Republican Party Platform, reprinted in 2
NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS 965, 974 (Donald Bruce Johnson ed., 1978).
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increasingly ideological as partisans seek judges who interpret the law
in light of their comprehensive doctrines instead of starting with the
Constitution.
After 1980, gradually the Christian Right emerged as a new force
in American politics,120 its power culminating in the 2000 election of
George W. Bush.
The younger Bush had realized "My God, you could win the
White House with nothing but evangelicals," 12 1 during his father's
1988 campaign, when he served as liaison to evangelical voters. The
Christian Right recognized that the younger, but not the elder, Bush
was one of the faithful. In 2000, the Christian Right attained their
goal of bringing its religious values to the White House. Bush
pursued the groups' agenda during his first term by funding faith-
based organizations without regard to the antidiscrimination laws.1 2
He was reelected in 2004 largely due to a nationwide religious
campaign to ban same-sex marriage. He then appointed two of the
Catholic Justices (Roberts and Alito) who formed the majority in
Hobby Lobby, fulfilling campaign promises to appoint "strict
constructionists" to the Court.123
President Barack Obama continued the religious emphasis of his
predecessor. Early in his political career, Obama famously criticized
fellow Democrats for adhering too rigidly to Kennedy's
separationism. 124 The Kennedy approach not only unfairly excluded
people of faith from the public square, Obama argued, but also
foolishly conceded religious voters to Republicans and therefore lost
120. RICHARD A. VIGUERIE, THE NEW RIGHT: WE'RE READY TO LEAD 27-30
(1981); RICHARD V. PIERARD & ROBERT DEAN LINDER, CIVIL RELIGION & THE
PRESIDENCY 231, 263 (1988).
121. Sam Allis, A Timely Look at How Faith Informs Bush Presidency, BOSTON
GLOBE, Apr. 29, 2004, at D1.
122. Executive Order 13279, Dec. 12, 2002, Equal Protection of the Laws for Faith-
Based and Community Organizations, 67 Fed. Reg. 77141 (Dec. 16, 2002).
123. Jeffrey Rosen, Can Bush Deliver a Conservative Court?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14,
2004), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/14/weekinreview/14jeff.html?pagewant
ed=1#.
124. See Senator Barack Obama, Keynote Address at the Sojourners/Call to Renewal
"Building a Covenant for New America" Conference: Faith and Politics (June 28, 2006),
TRANSCRIPT: Obama's 2006 Sojourners/Call to Renewal Address on Faith and Politics,




elections.' After Obama won elections, religious politics seemed a
good idea to Democrats and Republicans alike.
In contrast to Kennedy's separation model, Obama developed a
"translation" approach to religion and politics. He argued that
because of American pluralism, politicians should "translate their
concerns into universal, rather than religion-specific, values." 2 '
Obama's original opposition to same-sex marriage, for example, was
based upon his interpretation of the Bible.'27 Because the Bible (in
Obama's view) forbade gay marriage, so would he. In this Obama,
like Bush, was just like the comprehensive doctrine theorists
described in Part I; he started with his personal beliefs and applied
them to the Constitution. In my language, this is the pro-imposition,
values-based model of governance; the translation might hide the
imposition, but does not change its nature. It is now equally accepted
by Republican and Democratic politicians alike.
2. The Pro-Faith Legacy of President Clinton
Ironically, it was another Democratic Southern Baptist
president-William Jefferson Clinton-who most successfully
implemented the Christian values agenda that culminated in Hobby
Lobby. Clinton enthusiastically praised the "theologian judge"
Stephen Carter's 1993 book, The Culture of Disbelief, for accurately
capturing his experience that the public culture was hostile to religion
and unfairly excluded religious voices from debate. 28 Clinton's
respect for Stephen Carter motivated him to pursue "a two-step plan
for integration of religion into the public square. First, he implore[d]
religions to work together. Second, he advocate[d] bringing them
closer to the government." 2 9 In other words, he encouraged citizens
to impose their comprehensive doctrines upon one another; indeed,
he even helped popular comprehensive doctrines set the political and
legal agenda for his administration.
Clinton ran with Carter's theologian judge model and
implemented it extensively in the political arena to support numerous
125. Id.
126. BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE: THOUGHTS ON RECLAIMING THE
AMERICAN DREAM 219 (2008).
127. Id. at222-24.
128. STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF: HOW AMERICAN LAW
AND POLITICS TRIVIALIZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993).
129. Marci A. Hamilton, Religion and the Law in the Clinton Era: An Anti-Madisonian
Legacy, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Winter/Spring 2000, at 359, 364-65.
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policies favoring comprehensive doctrines."'o Two major religion-
based laws concern us here, namely, the Defense of Marriage Act
("DOMA") of 1996 and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
("RFRA") of 1993.1' Both statutes were misnamed. DOMA
restricted the right to same-sex marriage instead of defending it.
RFRA did not restore anything, but instead created special rights for
religious groups and individuals that they had never enjoyed before.
Hobby Lobby, of course, is the result of RFRA.
The fate of the two statutes confirms the dangers of
comprehensive doctrine imposition and the wisdom of my non-
imposition model of government. In 2013, the Court honored
constitutional principles over religion principles by invalidating
sections of DOMA in United States v. Windsor.132 In 2014, the Court
honored religious principles instead of constitutional principles by
adopting a broad interpretation of RFRA and imposing religious
doctrine on women employees in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby."'
Unfortunately, in the long run, Hobby Lobby is likely to undermine
Windsor and the right to same-sex marriage, as I explain later in Part
II.
a. Defense of Marriage Act
The Hawaii Supreme Court started the same-sex marriage ball
rolling in 1993 when it ruled in Baehr v. Lewin that a ban on same-sex
marriage was a form of sex discrimination that must be subjected to
heightened scrutiny.'34 Although Hawaii voters immediately rejected
same-sex marriage at the ballot box, fear of same-sex marriage
gripped the nation as other states worried that they might have to
recognize gay and lesbian marriages performed in Hawaii or other
states.'
In a forceful response to Baehr, Congress passed and President
Clinton signed DOMA in 1996, which restricted marriage in two
ways. First, for purposes of federal benefits, DOMA defined
130. Id.
131. See 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006); 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006) (DOMA); 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et
seq. (2006) (RFRA).
132. 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
133. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
134. Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993).
135. For a description of the amendment process, see David Orgon Coolidge, The
Hawai'i Marriage Amendment: Its Origins, Meaning and Fate, 22 U. HAW. L. REV. 19, 32-
38 (2000).
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marriage as between a man and a woman only.' 6  Second-in
contradiction to the usual rule of the Full Faith and Credit Clause,
which requires states to respect the legal rulings of other states-
DOMA authorized the states to refuse recognition to same-sex
marriages.13" If marriage became legal in Hawaii, Texas would not
have to recognize it.
The justifications for DOMA were traditional Christian
arguments. The House Report explained the government's interests
in DOMA by citing testimony from Professor Hadley Arkes, who was
well-known for arguing that a priori moral principles should be
applied to the Constitution."' Rejecting the idea that marriage should
publicly recognize "love between persons," Arkes argued, "at its core,
it is hard to detach marriage from what may be called the 'natural
teleology of the body': namely, the inescapable fact that only two
people, not three, only a man and a woman, can beget a child.",1 9
Furthermore, the House reported that DOMA appropriately
protected "traditional notions of morality" and that civil marriage law
is justifiably based upon "a moral conviction that heterosexuality
better comports with traditional (especially Judeo-Christian)
morality."140
All those references to tradition were in fact invoking a
traditional Christian account of marriage that is much older than the
Constitution and American law. Its lineage links to St. Augustine, the
prominent Christian Bishop of Hippo who wrote On the Good of
Marriage around the year 401 C.E. Augustine established the
essential definition of marriage that dominated centuries of Christian
history and later influenced American marital law, including
DOMA.14' According to the Bishop of Hippo, marriage has three
goods: procreation, fidelity, and indissolubility.14
St. Augustine was troubled by the sinfulness of sexual desire,
which he viewed "as in itself an evil passion (that is, distorted by
136. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2006).
137. 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
138. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 13 (1996) (footnote omitted), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2917.
139. H.R. REP. No. 104-664, at 13 (1996) (footnote omitted), reprinted in 1996
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2905, 2917.
140. Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
141. See generally Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Augustinian Goods of Marriage: The




original sin)." 43 Instead of insisting that Christians renounce all sex,
however, he identified a moral rationale that justified some sexual
activity, namely procreative heterosexual marriage. His theory of
marriage channeled sexual desire into its proper procreative purpose
within heterosexual marriage. Such limited sexual activity was moral
because it served the goal of procreation, thus avoiding unruly
passion and sin.
For St. Augustine, marriage was more than procreative because
the marital relationship fostered a personal loyalty between
spouses.'" Hence the first two goods of marriage provided a
procreative as well as an interpersonal relationship that set
appropriate limits on human sexuality.
As for the third good of marriage, "[e]ven where the spouses are
unable to procreate, even where one spouse has abandoned the other,
Augustine asserted, they remain symbolically bound to one
another." 45 That bond cannot be broken and provides the basis for
the argument that Christians may not divorce.
With DOMA, President Clinton and Congress inscribed the
Augustinian notion of marriage into the United States Code. In Part
II below I explain that judges who subscribe to the Augustinian ideal
have consistently ruled against marriage equality while those
interpreting the Constitution have supported it.
In retrospect, it seems puzzling that a Democratic president like
Bill Clinton, an early supporter of gay and lesbian rights, did not veto
DOMA. Recent commentary suggests that "[i]nside the White
House, there was a genuine belief that if the President vetoed
[DOMA], his reelection could be in jeopardy."1 46 Clinton's support of
DOMA for electoral reasons, thus, confirms the political clout of
religious groups.
In 1993, Clinton joined with those groups to champion RFRA's
passage. Unfortunately, RFRA threatens gay and lesbian rights but
143. MARGARET A. FARLEY, JUST LOVE: A FRAMEWORK FOR CHRISTIAN SEXUAL
ETHICS 40 (2006).
144. Id. This understanding of the first two goods of marriage explains the moral
opposition to contraception in modern Roman Catholic thought that persists today in the
contraceptive mandate cases. Having sex without procreative intent treats the partner as a
"fornicator" and undermines the essential procreative purpose of marriage, which is
always present even when procreation cannot or does not occur. See Reid, Jr., supra note
141, at 454.
145. Id. at 453 (emphasis added).
146. Richard Socarides, Why Bill Clinton Signed the Defense of Marriage Act, THE
NEW YORKER (Mar. 8, 2013), available at http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/news
desk/2013/03/why-clinton-signed-the-defense-of-marriage-act.html.
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everyone else's rights as well. The statute marked the triumph of
values-based, imposition-heavy government over civil rights.
b. Religious Freedom Restoration Act
The sad story of RFRA's passage has been told brilliantly by
Professor Marci Hamilton, the Cardozo Law professor who
successfully persuaded the Supreme Court in City of Boerne v. Flores
that RFRA was unconstitutional as applied to the state
governments.'47 I summarize the highlights of RFRA's history here as
they relate to values imposition and Hobby Lobby.
In 1990, before Clinton was elected president, the Supreme
Court decided Employment Division v. Smith.148 The case involved
two Native American drug counselors from Oregon who used peyote
in a religious ritual. Because peyote use was illegal under state law,
the two men were denied unemployment compensation benefits after
their employer fired them for drug use.
Justice Antonin Scalia wrote the opinion denying the men's First
Amendment Free Exercise Clause claim that they were entitled to the
benefits because they were fired for practicing their religion. Justice
Scalia wrote that the criminal drug laws were "neutral laws of general
applicability" that the men must obey; the First Amendment did not
entitle them to any exemption.1 49 He concluded an exemption-based
interpretation of the First Amendment would improperly allow every
citizen to become "a law unto himself" and thus undermine the rule
of law.5
Although there was a long, pre-Smith history of Court cases that
applied Smith's rule-including the Court's first free exercise
opinion'-many religious groups and individuals pushed back
against the Court's decision. After 1992, the Smith opposition found
a new friend in the Clinton White House. Clinton interpreted Smith
as hostile to religious freedom instead of recognizing it as an opinion
that protected civil rights by requiring all citizens to follow the law
equally.
Clinton then empowered an array of religious groups,
conservative and liberal, to pass RFRA for the direct purpose of
147. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997); Marci Hamilton, The Religious
Freedom Restoration Act is Unconstitutional, Period, 1 U. PA. J. CONST. LAW 1 (1998).
148. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
149. Id. at 880.
150. Id. at 885.
151. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
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overruling Smith. Under RFRA, if a neutral law substantially
burdens religion, the government-state or federal-has to
demonstrate that it has a compelling government interest and has
used the least restrictive means to further that interest. 5 2 That test
was not only the strictest form of scrutiny available in constitutional
law, but had never been the law of the First Amendment pre-Smith.
Moreover, Congress applied this demanding new standard to both the
state and the federal governments. Every neutral law in America was
now subject to legal challenge.
In City of Boerne v. Flores, Professor Hamilton persuaded the
Court that RFRA was unconstitutional as applied to the states
because it exceeded Congress's powers under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Central to that holding was the Court's
ruling that Congress's action in passing RFRA was disproportionate
and incongruent because there was insufficient evidence of religious
discrimination nationwide to justify the sweeping legislation. In other
words, the RFRA coalition's understanding that the nation was
populated by religious discrimination was not supported by any hard
evidence.
In Boerne, only Justice John Paul Stevens identified another
aspect of RFRA's infirmity. Justice Stevens concluded that RFRA
violated the Establishment Clause in preferring religion to irreligion
by "provid[ing] the Church with a legal weapon that no atheist or
agnostic can obtain."15 4 Despite a number of constitutional infirmities
(including separation of powers problems), federal RFRA survived
Boerne, and religious freedom advocates went back to Congress to
strengthen its language. The Clinton administration never allowed
RFRA's constitutionality to be challenged and it remained on the
books as a ticking time bomb for religious believers that exploded in
Hobby Lobby.
Lost in the debate by all but a few of RFRA's critics was Justice
Stevens' important warning that the statute favored the religious over
the nonreligious and gave religious organizations "a legal weapon
that no atheist or agnostic can obtain."' As we shall see, Hobby
Lobby allowed religious employers to use that weapon against the
rights of their female employees.
152. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. (2006).
153. City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 507.
154. Id. at 537 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
155. Id.
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c. RFRA's Broad Interpretation in Hobby Lobby
1. Background
Hobby Lobby demonstrates the statute's danger. Under Smith,
the government's neutral and generally applicable laws-including
the contraceptive mandate-are upheld. In contrast, under RFRA, if
a neutral law substantially burdens religion, the government must
demonstrate that it has used the least restrictive means to further a
compelling interest. In Hobby Lobby, that strict standard
undermined a neutral law that was designed to protect women's
equality and contraceptive freedom.
American women have long paid more for health care than men
because the costs of reproductive care, including contraception, are
frequently not covered by health insurance policies. After the Food
and Drug Administration approved Viagra in 1996, for example,
many insurers covered this new drug for men's sexual problems but
not contraceptives for women. As a matter of gender equity, many
states then passed legislation that required employers who provide
prescription drug coverage to include contraception in their insurance
plans. Such legislation provoked demands from religious employers
to be exempt from the new laws' requirements. But, applying Smith,
the highest courts of New York"' and California,' inter alia, rejected
constitutional challenges to those neutral insurance laws of general
applicability and held that religious employers must provide
contraceptive insurance coverage.
If we analogize the above state cases to Hobby Lobby, the
Supreme Court should have reached the same result: require religious
employers to provide contraceptive insurance coverage. The
contraceptive mandate of the ACA focused on the same goal of
women's health care equality required by many states. The ACA
required employer health care plans to contain preventive care
coverage, which included twenty FDA-approved contraceptive
methods and sterilization procedures.1 8  However, in contrast to
Smith and the state cases, religious exemptions and RFRA
undermined the entire legislative scheme.
The ACA originally exempted purely religious employers like
houses of worship from its requirements, but otherwise applied the
contraceptive regulations to both for-profit and nonprofit religious
156. Catholic Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459 (N.Y. 2006).
157. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc., v. Super. Ct., 85 P.3d 67 (Cal. 2004).
158. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2006); 77 Fed. Reg. 8725-8726 (2012).
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employers.159 The uproar against the Obama administration about
that original rule was equally vigorous and ridiculous. The Catholic
bishops and other religious employers like the University of Notre
Dame accused the administration of conducting a war on religious
freedom, even though, under Smith, there is no constitutional right
that excuses religious employers from compliance with neutral and
general laws. Amish employers, for example, have long been
required to pay Social Security taxes'" and fundamentalist Christian
employers must pay men and women equally, even if such actions
contradict their religious values.
Unfortunately, as RFRA and DOMA demonstrated during the
1990s, it is virtually impossible for politicians to confront the political
clout of organized majority religions, and the Obama administration
caved in to its religious critics. In the spirit of accommodation,
Obama naYvely offered a compromise that he thought would answer
the religious employers' objections. Under the compromise, someone
else would provide and pay for the insurance coverage. According to
the new regulations, religious employers who "1) oppose coverage for
contraceptive services, 2) operate as non-profit entities, 3) hold
themselves out as religious organizations, and 4) self-certify that they
meet the first three criteria," do not have to include contraceptive
coverage in their insurance plans.1 62  Depending on what type of
insurance coverage they offer, the religious employers give the self-
certification form to either their insurance company or a third-party
administrator, who then provides the coverage that the employer
opposes.
Dissatisfied with that accommodation, the religious nonprofit
employers continued to insist their religious freedom was threatened.
They insisted that signing the form that asserted their opposition to
contraception substantially burdened their exercise of religion.
They went back to court, arguing that the accommodation still
required them to "provide, pay for, and/or facilitate access to
coverage for these objectionable products and services,"'" thereby
substantially burdening their religion under RFRA.
159. 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a).
160. United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252,261 (1982).
161. See, e.g., Dole v. Shenandoah Baptist Church, 899 F.2d 1389, 1392 (4th Cir. 1990).
162. 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(b); 78 Fed. Reg. 39874 (2013).
163. Id.
164. See, e.g., Univ. of Notre Dame v. Sebelius, 743 F.3d 547 (7th Cir. 2014).
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While the religious nonprofits were litigating the new
accommodation, religious for-profit companies like Hobby Lobby
and Conestoga Wood went to court arguing that their religion was
also substantially burdened by the mandate. Unlike the Catholic
cases, the Christian Hobby Lobby and Mennonite Conestoga Wood
owners opposed only four of the twenty contraceptives because they
believed they were abortifacients. As a matter of faith, the Green
and Hahn families believe that life begins at fertilization, and
therefore consider any contraceptive method that prevents
implantation to be an abortion. For this reason they oppose the use
of intrauterine devices ("IUDs") as well as some hormonal
contraceptives.
At the same time, several for-profit companies owned by
Catholics sued in protest of all twenty contraceptives, because under
the traditional Augustinian theology described above, they believe all
artificial contraception is morally wrong. The non-Catholic for-profit
cases got to the Supreme Court first. In Hobby Lobby, the Court, by
a 5-4 vote, ruled for the employers and provided a broad reading of
RFRA that will encourage many future lawsuits and undermine more
civil liberties. 65
2. The Decision
The Court's opinion addressed all five statutory elements of
RFRA. For RFRA to be triggered, plaintiffs must establish that they
are persons whose exercise of religion is substantially burdened by
the government. Once a substantial burden is established, the
government must demonstrate that it has a compelling government
interest and used the least restrictive means to enforce it. In Hobby
Lobby, the Court read all components of the statute-persons, who
exercise religion, substantial burden, compelling government interest,
and least restrictive means-in a manner favorable to plaintiffs
demanding exemptions from neutral laws.1 "
Persons. As a threshold matter, the Court recognized for-profit
corporations as persons who can exercise religion under the statute.
Before the case reached the Supreme Court, some circuit courts had
concluded either that corporations cannot exercise religion at all
because they cannot pray or worship, or that only the religious
nonprofits were corporate persons protected by RFRA. The
Supreme Court disagreed, ruling that certain types of corporations-
165. 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
166. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. (2006).
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closely held ones like Conestoga Wood and Hobby Lobby, whose
ownership was a small group of family members-could sue under
RFRA.'" Moreover, this part of the decision attracted only two
dissents; Justices Kagan and Breyer did not join Justice Ginsburg's
dissent that for-profit corporations are not persons who exercise
religion under RFRA.
Although the Court's opinion appears to be limited to closely
held corporations, its reasoning could support any corporation's right
to claim RFRA's protection. Justice Samuel Alito's opinion for the
Court expressed skepticism that large corporations with many
shareholders would want to file RFRA lawsuits." But Hobby Lobby
opens the door for corporate RFRA claims, thus expanding the
possibilities for religious exemptions in corporate America.
Who Exercises Religion. The Court did not question that the
exercise of religion was involved in Hobby Lobby. Post-Boerne,
Congress passed another pro-religion statute, the Religious Land Use
and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), which amended
RFRA's definition of the exercise of religion from "exercise of
religion under the First Amendment" to "any exercise of religion,
whether or not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious
belief."" 9 Instead of explaining what is or is not the practice of
religion, the Court deferred to plaintiffs to define their religious
exercise. It is still not clear, for example, why providing insurance
coverage involves the exercise of religion.
Substantial Burden. On the substantial burden question, the
dissent, written by Justice Ginsburg, cogently argued that any burden
on the Greens' and Hahns' religion was "too attenuated" to qualify as
substantial.'70 The employees, not the employers, decide whether to
use contraception, and "no individual decision by an employee and
her physician ... is in any meaningful sense her employer's decision
or action."17 ' Under Ginsburg's analysis, Hobby Lobby is really about
the women employees' choice, not the employers' religion; employers
are not forced to use contraception and, therefore, their religion is
167. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2768-72.
168. Id. at 2774.
169. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A) (2006). The statute also should "be construed in
favor of a broad protection of religious exercise, to the maximum extent permitted by the
terms of this chapter and the Constitution." Id. at § 2000-cc-3(g) (2006).
170. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2799 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
171. Id.
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not substantially burdened. Substantial should mean something in
legal terms.
Justice Alito saw the burden analysis differently, again deferring
to plaintiffs' sincerely held beliefs. He wrote that the Greens' and
Hahns' belief that the four contraceptives cause abortion "implicates
a difficult and important question of religion and moral philosophy,
namely, the circumstances under which it is wrong for a person to
perform an act that is innocent in itself but that has the effect of
enabling or facilitating the commission of an immoral act by
another." 72 It is not for the Court, he concluded, to determine
whether a burden is substantial or insubstantial; the moral judgment
of the plaintiffs about what is burdensome is controlling.m7 Thus the
plaintiffs, not the courts, determine if their religion is substantially
burdened. This factor again favors challengers of neutral laws over
the government.
Compelling Interest. The government has a compelling interest
in promoting women's health and equality that is rooted in the
Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The Court,
however, only "assumed" that the government might have a
compelling interest in women's equality without giving it any
consideration or importance.m Justice Kennedy's concurrence tried
to give more weight to the consideration of gender equity."' But the
result of Hobby Lobby is that the Court allowed a woman's
reproductive rights to be trumped by a business owner's belief that
one of her contraceptives might be an abortifacient-without even
considering the importance of women's rights. In the area of
women's equality, the government will have a harder time
establishing a compelling government interest in future cases, and
plaintiffs should have an easier time winning cases.
Least Restrictive Means. In the biggest irony of the case, the
Court ruled that because there was another way to provide
insurance-namely the accommodation provided to the religious
nonprofits-the government could not meet the least restrictive
means test.7  Thus it was foolhardy for the Obama administration to
give into the rhetoric that the nonprofits' accommodation was
necessary to end a war on religious liberty. The accommodation of
172. Id. at 2778.
173. Id. at 2779.
174. Id. at 2759.
175. Id. at 2785 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
176. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2759.
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the religious nonprofits led to the accommodation of the religious for-
profits.
In identifying a second least restrictive means in addition to the
nonprofits' accommodation, Justice Alito opined that the "most
straightforward way" of providing contraceptive access would be for
the government to pay and "HHS has not shown that this is not a
viable alternative." Without any evidence, Alito concluded it would
not cost much for the government to provide contraception, and that
it should do so rather than burden the families' religious freedom.
This is incorrect. As Justice Ginsburg pointed out, an executive
order mandating such payment would require a period of notice and
comment, and there is no chance that Congress will now fund
contraceptive services. The Court's broad reading of the least
restrictive means test again favors plaintiffs; it leaves employers with
the ability to argue that the government should always pay for
something employers do not like.
Thus, because of RFRA and Hobby Lobby, anyone (corporate
or individual) can go to court, argue (unchallenged) that his religion is
substantially burdened, ignore the government's compelling interest,
and, by either pointing to any other existing government program or
telling the government to pay for a new program, meet the least
restrictive means standard. In other words, Hobby Lobby allows any
adherent of a comprehensive doctrine to demand an exemption to the
law that fits its religious needs, even if the rights of others are
restricted and the government has to create a new program just for
him. As the dissent pointed out, it is now possible to extend
exemptions "to employers with religiously grounded objections to
blood transfusions (Jehovah's Witnesses); antidepressants
(Scientologists); medications derived from pigs, including anesthesia,
intravenous fluids, and pills coated with gelatin (certain Muslims,
Jews, and Hindus); and vaccinations (Christian Scientists, among
others)."m1
The five Justices in the Majority ridiculed the dissent for arguing
that Hobby Lobby was an unprecedented "decision of startling
breadth." 7m Three days later, the same five-joined by Justice
Breyer-provided the first proof that the dissent was correct. In one
of the religious nonprofit cases involving Wheaton College, the Court
ordered the government to provide contraceptive coverage to
Wheaton employees, even though Wheaton had not signed the
177. Id. at 2805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
178. Id. at 2787.
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exemption form for reasons of conscience." As Justice Sotomayor
explained in a blistering dissent, the very accommodation that the
Court had praised in Hobby Lobby now became unacceptable in
Wheaton College.so The Court's action suggests that the religious
nonprofits are going to win their challenges to the contraceptive
mandate, as I explain in more detail in Part III.
And that is only the first step. With the help of the Court,
religious groups and individuals may now target other areas of health
law. Successful on contraception, their next target is gay and lesbian
rights, which have advanced in recent years only because some courts
of law have rejected comprehensive doctrine-based government and
instead interpreted the Constitution to protect marriage equality. As
Part II explains, LGBT rights cannot be protected as long as
comprehensive doctrines are imposed.
II. The Triumph of the Constitution: Marriage Equality
The comprehensive theorists and politicians of Part I argued that
public policy debates should be conducted on comprehensive grounds
until citizens reach agreement at the level of moral principle. The
prolonged debate about same-sex marriage belies their claims and
confirms that comprehensive doctrine-based public policy
undermines constitutional values. The full and lengthy public debate
among conflicting philosophical, historical and religious accounts of
marriage did not identify a moral principle around which all sides
could rally. Only a focus on the constitutional norm of equality and
the experience of same-sex couples protected gay and lesbian rights
against comprehensive prejudice. Same-sex marriage supporters lost
the political debate as long as it was conducted according to
comprehensive moral principles. Once same-sex marriage was
reframed to focus on the constitutional norm of equality, however, it
gained political ground."
Hobby Lobby creates a dangerous opportunity to reintroduce
religious views into the LGBT rights debate and to undermine the
advances of marriage and social equality. Hobby Lobby, after all,
demonstrates that rights can be reversed; contraceptive access, which
was once taken for granted post-Griswold, is now threatened. Given
179. Wheaton College v. Burwell, 134 S. Ct. 2806 (2014).
180. Id. at 2808-15.
181. For a discussion of framing and same-sex marriage, see GENE BURNS, THE
MORAL VETO: FRAMING CONTRACEPTION, ABORTION, AND CULTURAL PLURALISM IN
THE UNITED STATES 7 (2005).
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the intensity of religious opposition to same-sex marriage, LGBT
rights are the next target.
Contrasting constitutional marriage with what I call
comprehensive marriage, I explain below that marriage equality
succeeded only after courts based their analyses on equal protection
and due process instead of the traditional Augustinian account of
marriage that held sway for so many centuries. As long as religious
values were imposed on gays and lesbians through the force of law,
they had no chance to experience the equality of citizens. RFRA now
threatens the courts' achievements in protecting Constitution-based
marriage equality.
A. Constitutional Marriage
Federal same-sex marriage rights were long blocked by the
Supreme Court's 1986 ruling in Bowers v. Harwick, which held that
same-sex sodomy was not constitutionally protected and could be
criminalized.1 82 Bowers relied heavily on religious reasoning in ruling
against gay rights, with repeated references to traditional morality
and "Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards."1 83  For that
reason, the original impetus for legal same-sex marriage came from
state courts interpreting their own constitutions' due process, privacy,
or equal protection provisions. Marriage equality won whenever the
courts relied on law instead of religion to set the legal rule.
Most state courts relied on their equal protection clauses to
support same-sex marriage. Hawaii was the first to do so in 1993.'8
At least two options were available to state courts under equal
protection: to create a same-sex relationship equivalent in benefits to
marriage, or to require same-sex marriage itself. The Vermont
legislature, for example, passed a civil unions bill after the Vermont
Supreme Court ruled in 1999 that unequal benefits for gays and
heterosexuals violated the state's Common Benefits Clause.'
The Supreme Court overruled Bowers in 2003 in Lawrence v.
Texas after John Geddes Lawrence was prosecuted under a Texas
182. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
183. Id.
184. See Nelson Tebbe & Deborah A. Widiss, Equal Access and the Right to Marry,
158 U. PA. L. REV. 1375, 1383-84 (2010); see generally Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw.
1993). A Hawaii constitutional amendment then allowed the legislature to define
marriage as between a man and a woman only.
185. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 867 (Vt. 1999) (quoting VT. CONST. ch. I, art. 7.
Vermont's Constitution contains a Common Benefits Clause, stating that "government is,
or ought to be, instituted for the common benefit . . . of the people."). Id.
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criminal statute penalizing same-sex sodomy. Justice Kennedy's
opinion for the Court recognized a due process liberty right to sexual
privacy broad enough to include same-sex relations.1 6  Kennedy
addressed the religious arguments against same-sex relations that had
been vaunted in Bowers, concluding that citizens' religious
convictions and moral codes must not be imposed on others. Moral
disapproval is not an appropriate basis for the law. This is the key
lesson of the LGBT rights movement: religion must not be imposed
to limit constitutional rights.
Lawrence was a tremendous victory for the non-imposition
model of the Constitution, and state marriage rights soon followed.
Five months later, Massachusetts became the first state with same-sex
marriage after its Supreme Judicial Court ruled in Goodridge v.
Department of Public Health that the state's ban on same-sex
marriage violated equal protection under the state's constitution.
Unsurprisingly, the comprehensive doctrines launched a faith-
based "ferocious backlash" against Lawrence and Goodridge.'" Anti-
same-sex marriage initiatives developed in numerous states and
localities. President George W. Bush, a devout Christian thought to
oppose gay marriage for religious as well as political reasons, took the
lead in sponsoring anti-marriage equality amendments around the
country.' Opposition to same-sex marriage appealed to President
Bush's conservative evangelical base. For eight years (2000-2008),
President Bush made opposition to same-sex marriage a key aspect of
his political identity and a force in his 2004 reelection.
Some commentators attribute Bush's 2004 reelection to his
advocacy of a constitutional amendment banning same-sex marriage
and the presence of eleven successful anti-same-sex marriage
initiatives on local ballots in November 2004.'9 When President Bush
spoke about same-sex marriage, he used religious, historical, and
cultural arguments without any consideration of constitutional norms.
186. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577-78 (2003).
187. Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948-49, 970-71 (Mass. 2003).
188. See Carolyn Lochhead, Pivotal Day for Gay Marriage in the U.S Nears!
Massachusetts Move to Legal Weddings May Intensify Backlash in Other States, S.F.
CHRONICLE, May 2, 2004, at Al; see also Adam Liptak, Gay Vows, Repeated from State to
State, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2009, at WK1.
189. See Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Says His Party is Wrong to Oppose Gay Civil
Unions, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 2004, at A21, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2004/10/26
/politics/campaign/26gay.html.
190. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, Sexual Politics and Social Change, 41 CONN. L.
REV. 1523, 1532 (2009).
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"The union of a man and a woman is the most enduring human
institution, honored and encouraged in all cultures and by every
religious faith," he argued. "Marriage cannot be severed from its
cultural, religious and natural roots without weakening the good
influence of society." "
From 2004 to 2009, thirty of thirty-eight anti-gay marriage
initiatives and referenda were successful.l' Nonetheless, on May 15,
2008, California became the second state supreme court to rule that a
ban on same-sex marriage violated equal protection. Because
California law already granted gays and lesbians in domestic
partnerships the same rights as married couples, the court ruled, the
state could not label heterosexual and same-sex relationships
differently. If the "opposite-sex couple is officially designated a
'marriage' whereas the union of a same-sex couple is officially
designated a 'domestic partnership,".. the court explained, equal
protection is violated. The Connecticut Supreme Court followed with
a similar ruling for same-sex marriage on October 28, 2008.194
Soon after the California court ruled for same-sex marriage,
however, a coalition of religious groups placed Proposition 8 on the
ballot. The initiative proposed an amendment to the California
Constitution to allow marriage between a man and a woman only.'
The Catholic Archbishop of San Francisco lobbied for the
amendment and persuaded the Elders of the Church of Jesus Christ
of Latter-day Saints to come on board. Together Catholics,
evangelical Christians and Latter-day Saints worked to protect
traditional marriage against the perceived assault from same-sex
marriage.' Even as Barack Obama cruised to presidential victory in
191. CNN Politics, Bush Calls for Ban on Same-Sex Marriages, CNN.COM (Feb. 25,
2004, 5:05 AM), http://articles.cnn.com/2004-02-24/politics/elecO4.prez.bush.marriage_1_si
ngle-state-or-city-marriage-rights-marriage-licenses?_s=PM:ALLPOLITICS.
192. Mathew S. Nosanchuk, Response: No Substitutions, Please, 100 GEO. L.J. 1989,
1999 (2012).
193. In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 398 (Cal. 2008).
194. See Kerrigan v. Comm'r of Pub. Health, 957 A.2d 407, 412 (Conn. 2008).
195. See CNNPolitics.com, Local Ballot Measures - Election Center 2008: Ballot
Measures, CNN.COM (Jan. 12, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/
results/ballot.measures/; Letter from the First Presidency of The Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-day Saints to Church Leaders in California, California and Same-Sex Marriage,
MORMON NEWSROOM (June 29, 2008), available at http://www.mormonnewsroom.org/
Idsnewsroomleng/commentary/california-and-same-sex-marriage.
196. See Jessica Garrison, California Churches Plan a Big Push Against Same-Sex
Marriage; Organizers Hope to Get 1 Million from Various Religions to Post Lawn Signs
Backing Prop. 8 in Unison Next Month, L.A. TiMES, Aug. 24, 2008, at B.
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November 2008, the legal right to same-sex marriage was repealed by
voters in the nation's most liberal state. Although Obama won 61 %
of California voters," 52% of the state approved Proposition 8, and
the main reason for the difference was religious opposition to gay
marriage.!
After the 2008 presidential election, more states joined
Massachusetts, California, and Connecticut in legalizing it. Iowa
became the first Midwestern state to join the club with its Supreme
Court's ruling on April 3, 2009.' Vermont, which had been the first
state court to require civil unions in 1999,21 passed legislation
authorizing gay marriage in April 2009.201 The Maine legislature also
approved same-sex marriage20 until voters repealed it in November
2009.203 In June 2009, a Catholic governor signed New Hampshire's
gay marriage legislation after the legislature included significant
religious exemptions in the bill.2 04 A Washington, D.C. law allowing
same-sex marriage arrived in December 2009.205 Roman Catholic
Governor Andrew Cuomo of New York received significant praise
for successfully shepherding same-sex marriage through the state
legislature on June 24, 2011. Washington State approved same-sex
marriage through legislation on February 13, 2012,206 and on March 1,
2012, Maryland did the same. 2 ' Finally, President Obama renounced
197. CNNPolitics.com, Local and National Election Results - Election Center 2008:
President: California, CNN.COM (Jan. 12, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.cnn.com/
ELECTION/2008/results/individual/#CAP00.
198. Id.
199. See generally Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (Iowa 2009).
200. See generally Baker, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999).
201. David Abel, Vermont Legalizes Same-Sex Marriage; 11th-Hour Change of Heart
Ends Veto, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 8, 2009, at Al.
202. Maria Sacchetti, Backers, Foes of Same-Sex Marriage Reflect; Vow to Fight on as
Maine Rejects Law, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 5, 2009, at B4; Jenna Russell & Eric
Moskowitz, Maine Governor OK's Gay Marriage, BOSTON GLOBE, May 7, 2009, at Al.
203. Sacchetti, supra note 202.
204. See Eric Moskowitz, N.H. Ties Gay-Marriage Knot; Revised Bill Assures
Religious Protections, BOSTON GLOBE, June 4,2009, at Al.
205. Ian Urbina, Nation's Capital Joins 5 States in Legalizing Same-Sex Marriage, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 4, 2010, at A20; Tim Craig, D.C. City Council Votes to Legalize Gay
Marriage; Opponents of Bill Look to Congress, Courts to Upend It, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec.
16, 2009, at A2.
206. Reuters, Washington: Gay Marriage Legalized, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2012, at
A17.
207. Governor Martin O'Malley signed the bill but "opponents-backed by many
churches-were expected to petition the law to a referendum on the November [2012]
ballot." Maryland Governor Signs Bill Legalizing Gay Marriage, USA TODAY (Mar. 1,
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his long, biblically rooted opposition to same-sex marriage on May 9,
2012, and joined the marriage equality movement.
In a historic turnaround during the 2012 elections, Maryland,
Maine, and Washington voters approved same-sex marriage, and an
anti-marriage ballot amendment failed in Minnesota. After the
election, Rhode Island (2013), Delaware (2013), and Minnesota
(2013) legalized same-sex marriage. Finally, in June 2013, the United
States Supreme Court invalidated the part of DOMA that denied
equal benefits to same-sex couples while leaving intact the full faith
and credit section.20 After the Court also dismissed the Proposition 8
case on standing grounds, a district court's order invalidating
Proposition 8 took effect and same-sex marriage became legal again
in California.2 0
The Court issued a full opinion on the merits in Windsor, the
litigation challenging DOMA. Plaintiff Edith Windsor and Thea
Spyer had been partners since 1963; they married in Toronto in 2007.
Their home state of New York recognized their Canadian marriage.
Nonetheless, after Spyer died, the federal government charged
Windsor $363,053 in taxes because pursuant to DOMA their marriage
did not qualify for the estate tax exemption. Justice Kennedy wrote
the 5-4 decision in Windsor's favor.210
According to Justice Kennedy, under equal protection law, the
"avowed purpose and practical effect of [DOMA] are to impose a
disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all who enter
into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned authority
of the states."21 ' Kennedy argued, as he had in Lawrence, that moral
disapproval of homosexuality is not a rational basis for legislation.
Kennedy, noting that DOMA affected over 1,000 federal benefits
statutes, concluded "DOMA's principal effect is to identify a subset
of state-sanctioned marriages and make them unequal. The principal
purpose is to impose inequality." 21 2  In DOMA, the federal
2012, 6:23 PM), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-03-01/maryland-
gay-marriage-law/53319758/1. Voters, however, ultimately approved a different
referendum-the Civil Marriage Protection Act-which upheld the legality of same-sex
marriages. Official 2012 Presidential General Election Question Text, MD. STATE BD. OF
ELECTIONS (Nov. 28, 2012, 8:56 AM), http://www.elections.state.md.us/elections/2012/
results/general/gen-qtext_20124_ S_00_4_06_.html.
208. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2682-83 (2014).
209. Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
210. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2681.
211. Id. at 2693.
212. Id. at 2694.
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government unconstitutionally denied equal protection to same-sex
marriage couples. Thus, one of the Clinton administration's pro-
religion excesses was exposed; DOMA had in fact restricted equality
and freedom in the name of religion.
Post-Windsor, all twenty federal district courts to review state
same-sex marriage bans invalidated them. On June 25, 2014, in
Kitchen v. Herbert, the Tenth Circuit became the first federal court of
appeals to rule that same-sex marriage is a constitutional right,
thereby striking down Utah's ban.213 The court's ruling is a powerful
statement of marriage equality, affirming "the Fourteenth
Amendment protects the fundamental right to marry, establish a
family, raise children, and enjoy the full protection of a state's marital
laws." The Fourth Circuit followed with a similar ruling on July 28,
2014, the Seventh Circuit on September 4, 2014, and the Ninth Circuit
on October 7, 2014.214 After the Sixth Circuit upheld same-sex
marriage bans, the Supreme Court granted cert.215
The circuit courts' opinions also demonstrated that only
illegitimate, comprehensive doctrine-based, morality-imposing
reasons remain to oppose marriage equality. Nonetheless, the
comprehensive doctrines fought and continue to fight same-sex
marriage all the way, as the following section explains, and can be
expected to do so again with the new Hobby Lobby weapon in their
toolbox.
B. Comprehensive Marriage
Several courts recognized religion's role in restricting LGBT
rights. While ruling for marriage equality, the Iowa and Connecticut
Supreme Courts correctly identified religion as the primary source of
opposition to gay and lesbian rights.
The unanimous Supreme Court of Iowa was most direct in
reaching that conclusion. Citing a 2008 Des Moines Register study
demonstrating that opposition to same-sex marriage rose as high as
80% among people "with a high level of religious commitment," the
court acknowledged "the reason left unspoken by the County [in its
defense of the anti-marriage law]: religious opposition to same-sex
marriage." Recognizing that adherents of other religions-such as
213. Kitchen v. Herbert, 755 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2014).
214. Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352 (4th Cir. 2014); Baskin v. Bogan, 766 F.3d 648
(7th Cir. 2014); Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014).
215. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted sub norn. Bourke v.
Beshear, 2015 WL 213651 (2015).
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Buddhists, Quakers, Unitarians, and Reform and Reconstructionist
Jews-hold equally sincere religious views that accept same-sex
marriage, the Iowa court decided the case "as civil judges, far
removed from the theological debate of religious clerics, and
focus[ed] only on the concept of civil marriage and the state licensing
system that identifies a ... class of persons entitled to secular rights
and benefits." 216
The Iowa Justices who voted for marriage equality were
promptly voted out of office by a coalition of religious groups.
Like Iowa, the Connecticut Supreme Court confirmed that
"[m]uch of the condemnation of homosexuality derives from firmly
held religious beliefs and moral convictions."217 Nonetheless, it ruled,
because "marriage is a state sanctioned and state regulated
institution, religious objections to same-sex marriage cannot play a
role in our determination of whether constitutional principles of
equal protection mandate same-sex marriage."218
Wherever religious concepts held sway, same-sex marriage lost.
The dominant theological ideal that courts used to restrict marriage
rights was the concept that every marital act must be procreative,
which, as I explained above,219 was the original idea of the fifth-
century Christian Bishop and Saint Augustine of Hippo. Augustine
thought that sexual passion was an evil desire that must be channeled
solely into the procreative purpose of heterosexual marriage.
Incredibly, some modern judges not only agree with him, but think
Augustine's ideas should determine the marriage laws of the states.
Reacting to the first state supreme court to require marriage
equality, for example, dissenting Massachusetts Justice Robert Cordy
identified the procreative purpose of marriage as the reason to deny
equal marital status to gays and lesbians. Marriage and procreation
are inextricably linked, according to Cordy; "[b]ecause same-sex
couples are unable to procreate on their own, any right to marriage
they may possess cannot be based on their interest in procreation,
which has been essential to the Supreme Court's denomination of the
right to marry as fundamental." 2 20
Similarly, Ninth Circuit Judge N.R. Smith dissented from his
court's ruling invalidating Proposition 8, the California initiative that
216. Varnum, 763 N.W.2d at 905.
217. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 433.
218. Id. at 475.
219. See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text.
220. Goodridge, 798 N.E.2d at 985.
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defined marriage as between a man and a woman only. Smith argued
that the district court had failed to take seriously the two state
justifications for marriage, namely the "responsible procreation
theory" and the "optimal parenting theory."22 ' The first theory argues
that heterosexual marriage "'steers procreation into marriage'
because opposite-sex couples are the only couples who can procreate
children accidentally or irresponsibly." 2 2 2  The second theory
concludes that a committed relationship of one man and one woman
is the best environment for raising children.2 2
In Connecticut, dissenting Justice Peter Zarella also adopted the
"responsible procreation" theory because the actual purpose of
marriage is "to privilege and regulate procreative conduct," a
distinction that "has its basis in biology, not bigotry." 2 24 Marriage has
been recognized as a fundamental civil right, the justice argued, only
because it is procreative.
Justice Samuel Alito used the same approach in his dissent in
United States v. Windsor, where he contrasted two "competing views"
of marriage.225 One, the "traditional," "conjugal," or opposite-sex
vision, which says, "[M]arriage was created for the purpose of
channeling heterosexual intercourse into a structure that supports
child rearing." 2 26 Suggesting that even sterile heterosexual marriages
are procreative (and therefore permissible while same-sex marriage is
banned), Alito wrote that marriage "is intrinsically ordered to
producing new life, even if it does not always do so." 2 21
In contrast, the "consent-based" view defines marriage as the
"solemnization of mutual commitment-marked by strong emotional
attachment and sexual attraction-between two persons."2 2 8  Alito
recognized that the consent vision of marriage is "very prominent"
and "infuse[s]" our popular culture.229 Nonetheless, he concluded,
because the Constitution is silent about marriage, federal and state
governments are free to prefer traditional to consent-based marriage,
221. Perry v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1106 (9th Cir. 2012) (N.R. Smith, J., concurring in




224. Kerrigan, 957 A.2d at 516-17.
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or, in other words, to impose their moral beliefs on one another in
defiance of Lawrence.
Post-Windsor, Judge Paul J. Kelly dissented from the Tenth
Circuit's historical ruling that same-sex marriage is a fundamental
right, and Judge Niemeyer dissented from the Fourth Circuit's
subsequent identical ruling that same-sex marriage is a fundamental
right. What was the reason given for the dissents? The same one in
both circuits: the judges accepted Utah's and Virginia's
comprehensive doctrine-based (albeit unpersuasive) arguments that
marriage is for procreation and that heterosexual parents are morally
and biologically superior to gays and lesbians.
In recognizing a constitutional right to same-sex marriage, the
Fourth, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits rejected the religious
arguments and argued about due process and equal protection. The
first post-Windsor court of appeals to reject the right of same-sex
marriage, however, returned to the procreative rationale. 2 30
According to the Sixth Circuit in DeBoer v. Snyder:
People may not need the government's
encouragement to have sex. And they may not need
the government's encouragement to propagate the
species. But they may well need the government's
encouragement to create and maintain stable
relationships within which children may flourish. It is
not society's laws or for that matter any one religion's
laws, but nature's laws (that men and women
complement each other biologically), that created the
policy imperative.
St. Augustine couldn't have said it any better.
The validity of the procreative argument is completely
undermined by the facts that many heterosexual marriages are not
procreative, the state may not legally force any married couple to
bear children, technology now allows gays and lesbians to become
parents, and children flourish in a wide variety of family
environments. For these reasons, the judicial trend rejects
comprehensive doctrine-based marriage. Yet, as the Sixth Circuit
and the strong dissents in the other cases suggest, the opposition to
230. DeBoer, 772 F.3d 388, cert. granted sub nom. Bourke, 2015 WL 213651.
[Vol. 42:4686 HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
same-sex marriage is not yet ready to quit. RFRA has given the
opponents a new tool to restrict LGBT rights, as I explain in Part III.
III. The New Threat to Civil Rights: Broad RFRA
With Hobby Lobby's religion-friendly standard, all federal laws
are now subject to challenge, with the possibility of every citizen
becoming "a law unto himself" until the rule of law is undermined."'
State RFRAs can be expected to follow the federal lead.
Because of the intense religious opposition to LGBT rights as
demonstrated in the history of same-sex marriage, I explain in Part
III.A that gays and lesbians are now at risk of reduced insurance
coverage, fewer consumer services, and less employment protection
than they enjoyed pre-Hobby Lobby. In Part III.B, I identify
numerous other rights that are threatened due to the Court's broad
interpretation of RFRA.
A. The Next Threat: LGBT Rights
As explained above, much religious opposition to LGBT rights is
rooted in the Augustinian worldview that all sexual activity must be
heterosexual, monogamous, committed, and open to procreation.
From this perspective, neither domestic partnership nor same-sex
marriage is an acceptable moral choice; all same-sex partnerships are
prohibited. The Roman Catholic Church, moreover, teaches that
children are entitled to be born within a natural, heterosexual
relationship; consequently, assisted reproductive techniques such as
artificial insemination and in vitro fertilization violate the teaching of
the church. Such mechanisms, of course, are the usual means by
which gays and lesbians become parents.
Many comprehensive doctrines thus have broad moral objections
to most aspects of LGBT life. Justice Alito handed them an easy tool
for turning those objections into RFRA claims when he wrote that
courts could not question the beliefs of plaintiffs who oppose
"enabling or facilitating the commission of an immoral act by
another."2 32 If plaintiffs believe they are cooperating with the "evil"
of homosexuality or "giving scandal" by associating with gays and
lesbians, they easily meet the low substantial burden standard of
RFRA. 233
231. Smith, 494 U.S. at 885.
232. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2778.
233. Id.
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Because Hobby Lobby is an insurance case, it opens the door to
employers denying insurance coverage for the partners of their
LGBT employees as well as for medical services and decisions about
child bearing and rearing. An employer could argue that any health
coverage for LGBT partners violates his conscience, and-if gays are
not supposed to have children-try to keep his employees' children,
not only their partners, off the insurance policies. An employer may
additionally object to an employee who claims leave under the Family
and Medical Leave Act234 to care for a same-sex spouse. Almost
anything can be turned into a claim of "cooperation with evil."
Although supporters of RFRA will argue that such claims may
fail under RFRA's compelling government interest or least restrictive
means tests, the Court's recent jurisprudence suggests otherwise.
Hobby Lobby demonstrates that even the Supreme Court of the
United States is willing to ignore women's constitutionally protected
equality and reproductive freedom when religious groups try to
defeat them. Sexual orientation discrimination receives less
protection than gender discrimination under the Court's precedents,
so there is reason to believe that it, too, can be ignored. Moreover,
the least restrictive means test now allows plaintiffs to argue that the
government can provide the protection that individual employers
oppose. Thus, there is no reason to conclude that courts will side with
gays and lesbians over the religious opponents of same-sex rights.
LGBT consumers are also at risk. Pre-Hobby Lobby, owners of
commercial businesses across the country argued for a religious right
not to serve customers planning same-sex marriages. In New Mexico,
the owner of Elane Photography refused to photograph a same-sex
marriage because of her religious belief in "traditional marriage."a5
In Colorado, the owner of the Masterpiece Cake Shop refused to
bake a cake for a same-sex wedding.236 Although the New Mexico
Supreme Court and the Colorado Civil Rights Commission upheld
their states' antidiscrimination laws, Hobby Lobby offers new
possibilities for federal civil rights statutes to be ignored in the
corporate context.
234. 29 U.S.C. § 2601 etseq. (2006).
235. Elane Photography, LLC v. Willock, 309 P.3d 53 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S.
Ct. 1787 (2014).
236. Craig v. Masterpiece Cake Shop, CR 2013-0008, Colorado Office of
Administrative Courts (Dec. 6, 2013), available at https://www.aclu.org/sites/default/files/
assets/initial decisioncaseno._cr_2013-0008.pdf.
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The fallout from Hobby Lobby will also reach to state RFRAs,
which will imitate and expand their own protections to be as broad or
broader than Hobby Lobby. Indiana passed a broad RFRA to allow
the state's businesses to discriminate against unfavored customers.
Kansas, Arizona and Arkansas also tried to pass similar religious
freedom bills that allowed for- and nonprofit entities to refuse
services to gays and lesbians. Mississippi has had an extended debate
whether its state RFRA allows corporations to refuse goods and
services whenever they like. Because the Supreme Court has
baptized corporate religious exercise in ways the states never did,
some states can be expected to expand corporate religious rights,
especially to reject LGBT customers.238
After all, as Professor Ira Lupu has argued, if other companies
are available to provide goods and services to customers, then the
least restrictive means test can always be met.239
Under Hobby Lobby, all same-sex employer-employee relations
are now at risk. As Justice Ginsburg pointed out in her dissent,
employers can now assert religious reasons to avoid the
antidiscrimination laws. Justice Alito responded to Justice Ginsburg
that the government has a compelling interest in combating racial
discrimination. He said nothing, however, about gender or sexual
orientation discrimination. LGBT employment discrimination faces a
new threat post-Hobby Lobby.
And LGBT rights are only the beginning of the problem.
B. The Rest of Civil Rights
The implications of Hobby Lobby for reproductive rights are
broad and dangerous. The Court conveniently granted certiorari on
two cases with non-Catholic plaintiffs who opposed only four of the
twenty covered contraceptives because they believed them to be
abortifacients. The majority of the contraceptive cases, however-
both nonprofit and for-profit-involve Catholic employers who
237. Garrett Epps, What Makes Indiana's Religious Freedom Law Different?, THE
ATLANTIC, Mar. 30, 3015, at http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/03/what-ma
kes-indianas-religious-freedom-law-different/388997/.
238. See Kansas House Bill No. 2453, 2014 Session, available at www.kslegislature.
org/li/b20l3-14/measures/documents/hb2453_01_0000.pdf; Arizona Senate Bill 1062,
Second Regular Session 2014, available at www.azleg.gov/legtext/51leg/2rbills/sblO62p
pdf.
239. Ira C. Lupu, Hobby Lobby and the Dubious Enterprise of Religious Exemptions,
38 HARV. J.L. & GENDER (forthcoming 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract
=2466571.
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oppose all contraception and sterilization. This is another legacy of
St. Augustine; the Church teaches that having sex without procreative
intent treats the partner as a "fornicator" and undermines the
essential procreative purpose of marriage, which is always present
even when procreation cannot or does not occur.2 4
Immediately after Hobby Lobby issued, the Court remanded all
the for-profit Catholic contraceptive cases with directions to decide
them under the Court's religion-friendly standard.24' Because of
Hobby Lobby's plaintiff-friendly elements, I expect all the Catholic
employers, for-profit and nonprofit, to win their broader challenges
to the mandate so that employers are freed of any obligation to
women's health care equality, which was a fundamental purpose of
the legislation.
On the subject of abortion, the Court deferred completely to the
Greens' and Hahns' belief that some contraceptives are abortifacients
without requiring any scientific proof that this was so. This
conclusion will enhance the stature of the Personhood Movement,
which has sought to pass statutes and constitutional amendments
holding "the life of each human being begins with fertilization,
cloning, or its functional equivalent," where fertilization is defined as
"the process of a human spermatozoa penetrating the cell membrane
of a human oocyte to create a human zygote, a one-celled human
embryo, which is a new unique human being." 242  Proposed
personhood amendments have been interpreted to prohibit surgical
abortion, medical abortions using RU-486, termination of ectopic
pregnancies, intrauterine devices, emergency contraception, some
hormonal contraception, IVF treatment, IVF embryo discard, stem
cell derivation, cryopreservation of eggs for women with cancer or
fertility concerns, and medical treatment of pregnant women.243
Employees can now forget insurance coverage for all those items
because their employers' religious beliefs about when life begins
cannot be challenged in court.
240. See Reid, Jr., supra note 141, at 454.
241. See, e.g., Gilardi v. U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 733 F.3d 1208 (D.C.
Cir. 2013).
242. See, e.g., Jonathan F. Will, Beyond Abortion: Why the Personhood Movement
Implicates Reproductive Choice, 39 AM. J.L. & MED. 573 (2013).
243. See Glenn Cohen, Mississippi's Personhood Amendment, 2 THE J. OF LAW: PER.
LAB. OF LEGAL SCHOL. 437 (2012), available at http://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfs
blawg/2011/10/mississippis-personhood-amendment.html; Maya Manian, Lessons from
Personhood's Defeat: Abortion Restrictions and Side Effects on Women's Health, 74 OHIO
ST. L.J. 75 (2013); Will, supra note 242.
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The personhood definition cuts both ways. If a Jewish woman
sincerely believes that personhood starts at birth, does she possess an
absolute right to abortion under RFRA?
Some liberal groups have started filing their own claims for
RFRA protection. The Satanists filed a clever suit, arguing that a
woman's religious freedom was substantially burdened by being
forced to listen to the informed consent information connected to her
abortion.2" Why should any patient who objects to informed consent
be required to give it?
Or receive vaccinations? Or pay taxes? As the dissent
recognized, it is now possible to extend exemptions "to employers
with religiously grounded objections to blood transfusions (Jehovah's
Witnesses); antidepressants (Scientologists); medications derived
from pigs, including anesthesia, intravenous fluids, and pills coated
with gelatin (certain Muslims, Jews, and Hindus); and vaccinations
(Christian Scientists, among others)."245 Physician-assisted suicide is
also under attack.
Some sincere religious believers argue that their children should
work from an early age. Others believe that women should work only
at home or that men should receive higher wages than women
because they are biblically heads of families. Religious groups have
already argued against paying the minimum wage2" and equal pay for
equal work.247 In the past they discriminated against the unmarried.
and refused to seat African American patrons at restaurants.24 9 They
kill animals without regard to animal pain or human health and safety
regulations.2"o Using RLUIPA,251 the parallel land use statute that
matches RFRA, they expand buildings and parking lots without
regard for local zoning laws or the environment.
Take your pick. "According to counsel for Hobby Lobby, 'each
one of these cases ... would have to be evaluated on its own ...
apply[ing] the compelling-interest-least-restrictive-means test."'252
244. Meghan Keneally, Satanists Use Hobby Lobby Decision to Play Devil's Advocate,
ABC NEWS (Jul. 30, 2014), available at http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/satanists-hobby-
lobby-decision-play-devils-advocate/story?id=24772548.
245. Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2805 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
246. Tony & Susan Alamo Found. v. Sec'y of Labor, 471 U.S. 290,303 (1985).
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HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Comprehensive doctrines get to subject every law to their own
interests.
Conclusion
Long before he changed his mind about same-sex marriage, then-
Senator Obama chided the secularists who "ask believers to leave
their religion at the door before entering the public square":
Frederick Douglass, Abraham Lincoln, Williams
Jennings Bryant, Dorothy Day, Martin Luther King-
indeed, the majority of great reformers in American
history-were not only motivated by faith, but
repeatedly used religious language to argue for their
cause. So to say that men and women should not
inject their "personal morality" into public policy
debates is a practical absurdity. Our law is by
definition a codification of morality, much of it
grounded in the Judeo-Christian tradition.253
Nonetheless, President Obama himself later demonstrated that it
is not a "practical absurdity" to leave one's biblical religion at the
door; he finally listened to the experience of gay and lesbian
Americans and advocated same-sex marriage. Like President
Obama, many Americans set aside their personal morality after
realizing it did violence to their gay and lesbian family, friends, and
neighbors.
In contrast to what the comprehensive theorists argued in Part I,
it is fair, practical, and possible to follow the Constitution instead of
personal morality on questions of public policy. For too long,
Americans have been imposing their own personal beliefs upon the
laws. "In short, we have talked and talked about how to talk about
the Constitution, rather than just talking about it." 2 54
253. Senator Barack Obama, Keynote Address at the Sojourners/Call to Renewal
"Building a Covenant for New America" conference: Faith and Politics (June 28, 2006),
TRANSCRIPT: Obama's 2006 Sojourners/Call to Renewal Address on Faith and Politics,
SOJOURNERS: GOD'S POLITICS BLOG (Feb. 21, 2012, 3:36 PM), http://sojo.net/blogs/
2012/02/21/transcript-obamas-2006-sojournerscall-renewal-address-faith-and-politics.
254. Sara Aronchik Solow & Barry Friedman, How to Talk About the Constitution, 25
YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 69, 75 (2012) ("Law professors are mired in interpretive debates.
Lawyers and judges just interpret. And how those lawyers and judges interpret is telling,
especially in its contrast with academic debates.").
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Contraception? Start talking about women's equality
(Fourteenth Amendment) instead of your personal belief about how
an IUD works. Same-sex marriage? Start talking about due process
and the right to marry (Fourteenth Amendment) instead of
Augustine's belief that sex needs to be channeled to avoid sin.
Abortion? Start talking about women's equality and whether the
Constitution defines a person instead of the moment when a soul
enters a fetus.
Talk that way, and vote that way. Don't impose your
comprehensive beliefs on others through force of law. Hobby Lobby
teaches us that such imposition violates religious freedom.
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